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ARTICLE
SHRINKING THE COMMONS: TERMINATION
OF COPYRIGHT LICENSES AND
TRANSFERS FOR THE BENEFIT OF
THE PUBLIC
TIMOTHY K. ARMSTRONG*
Federal law limits the free alienability of copyright rights to prevent power-
ful transferees from forcing authors into unremunerative bargains. The limiting
mechanism is a statutory provision that permits authors or their heirs, at their
sole election, to terminate any transfer or license of any copyright interest dur-
ing a defined period. Indeed, the applicable provisions of the Copyright Act go
so far as to invalidate purported waivers by authors of their statutory termina-
tion powers.
These statutory provisions may constitute an impediment to the effective
grant of rights for the benefit of the public under widely used "open content"
licensing arrangements, such as the GNU General Public License ("GPL") for
software or the Creative Commons family of licenses for other sorts of expres-
sive works. Although recent case law suggests that such open-source or open-
content licensing arrangements should be analyzed under the same rules that
govern other copyright licenses, doing so necessarily raises the possibility of
termination of the license. If GPL or Creative Commons-type licenses are sub-
ject to later termination by authors (or their heirs), and this termination power
cannot validly be waived, then users of such works must confront the possibility
that the licenses may be revoked in the fiture and the works effectively with-
drawn from public use, with potentially chaotic results.
Although a number of judge-made doctrines may be invoked to restrict ter-
mination of a license granted for the benefit of the public, the better course
would be for Congress to enact new legislation expressly authorizing authors to
make a nonwaiveable, irrevocable dedication of their works, in whole or in part,
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to the use and benefit of the public-a possibility that the Patent Act expressly
recognizes, but the Copyright Act presently does not.
I. INTRODucrION
Copyrights imperfectly resemble property. Like property, the various
rights comprised in a copyright may be conveyed, separately or together,
from one owner to another.' Unlike transfers involving other forms of both
tangible and intellectual property, however, all transfers or licenses of copy-
right interests by a work's author are revocable. They may be terminated,
during a defined period, at the sole election of the author or the author's
statutory heirs.2 Further strengthening authorial control, the Copyright Act
expressly makes the author's unilateral power to rescind the transfer irrevo-
cable and nonwaiveable.3 Thus, copyright rights differ, in a fundamental
way, from any other form of property: their initial ownership cannot volun-
tarily be permanently and unconditionally divested.4
According to the legislative history, Congress intended the statutory
provisions allowing termination of transfers to protect authors of expressive
works from overreaching by powerful licensees, who may effectively pres-
sure authors to make transfers on unremunerative terms.' To be sure, exam-
ples of such overreaching are not difficult to locate in the cases construing
the termination provisions. As between authors and publishers, the latter fre-
quently enjoy superior bargaining power.6 Importantly, however, although
redressing unremunerative bargains and preventing overreaching by licen-
sees supply the underlying rationale for the termination rules, the statute
expressly makes all copyright licenses or transfers by the author terminable
without regard to the details of the parties' bargain.'
The statute's termination provisions may pose an underappreciated risk
to a wide variety of contemporary "open content" projects,' which depend
'17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) enumerates the copyright holder's exclusive rights, including the
fights to reproduce, distribute, and prepare derivative works from the copyrighted work. Addi-
tionally, some expressive works receive further protections in the form of exclusive fights of
public performance or display, or of digital audio transmission. See id. Each of these fights
may be owned and transferred separately upon whatever terms the parties to the transaction
agree to adopt. See generally id. § 201(d).
2 Id. §§ 203(a) (governing termination of transfers executed in 1978 or later), 304(c) (gov-
erning termination of transfers executed in 1977 or before). See generally infra Part II.B.I.
' See §§ 203(a)(5), 304(c)(5). See generally infra notes 255-56, 260 and accompanying
text.
4 The sole exception in the Copyright Act is for transfers by will, which are expressly
excluded from the operation of the termination provisions. See §§ 203(a), 304(c). For all vol-
untary transfers or licenses of copyright made inter vivos, however, termination remains poten-
tially available. Involuntary transfers, such as by expropriation or by operation of law, lie
outside the present inquiry. Regarding such transfers, see generally id. § 201(d)(1), (e).
See infra notes 236-39, 261-62 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.
See §§ 203(a)(5), 304(c)(5). See generally infra notes 255-60 and accompanying text.
8 "Open content," as used herein, refers to all expressive works licensed under terms that
allow copying, modification, and redistribution by unspecified third parties, with or without
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for their vitality upon specialized copyright licenses. From the Linux operat-
ing system9 to the Firefox web browser' ° to the Wikipedia encyclopedia" and
far beyond, a host of well-known and widely used informational goods have
been created by a global community of volunteers. Their efforts are coordi-
nated-indeed, their self-definitions are partly governed-by a family of
copyright licenses 2 crafted to permit successive creators to build upon the
efforts of their predecessors and to distribute their shared work product. 3
Recent case law suggests that, consistent with their creators' intent, these
licenses are valid under the Copyright Act: they grant rights to users that
would otherwise belong exclusively to the owner of the copyright in the
additional conditions such as restrictions on downstream users' choice of licenses for their own
content. See infra notes 64-65, 111, 128 and accompanying text (discussing so-called
"copyleft," "share-alike," or noncommercial usage provisions of some open-content licenses).
The term encompasses, at a minimum, open source software, as well as non-software works
licensed under the Creative Commons family of licenses. Cf, e.g., S~verine Dusollier, Sharing
Access to Intellectual Property Through Private Ordering, 82 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1391, 1397
(2007) (explaining that "open source" initiatives outside the domain of software are frequently
called "open content" or "open access" projects); Andrrs Guadamuz Gonzdlez, Scale-Free
Law: Network Science and Copyright, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1297, 1325-26 (2007) (recognizing
use of "open content" in a similar sense). Public domain works are also open content, al-
though they ordinarily do not depend for their "openness" on the terms of a license as other
open-content works do. But cf. infra Part IH.A.3 (discussing public domain licenses).
9 Linux, sometimes labeled "GNU/Linux" to reflect the contributions of the GNU Project,
arose from an effort to create a free alternative to the powerful Unix operating system that had
been developed at AT&T starting in the late 1960s. See STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN
SOURCE 20-53 (2004) (recounting history of Unix); see also infra note 46. The original Linux
kernel was written by Finnish programmer Linus Torvalds, although the kernel project alone
has since grown to include thousands of contributors, and many more developers write Linux
application software. WEBER, supra, at 94-127 (tracing development of Linux and related
projects); see also ERIC S. RAYMOND, A Brief History of Hackerdom, in THE CATHEDRAL AND
THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 5,
23-25 (1999); Jonathan Zittrain, Normative Principles for Evaluating Free and Proprietary
Software, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 265, 268-69 (2004).
tO Firefox represents a still rare, although perhaps increasing, phenomenon: a once-propri-
etary product (Netscape Navigator) released for community development under the open-
source model. Zittrain, supra note 9, at 278 & n.29; see also CHRISTOPHER M. KELTY, Two
Brrs: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE SOFTWARE 99-112 (Michael M. J. Fischer &
Joseph Dumit eds., 2008); Greg R. Vetter, Claiming Copyleft in Open Source Software: What if
the Free Software Foundation's General Public License (GPL) Had Been Patented?, 2008
MICH. ST. L. REV. 279, 312-14.
" The English-language version of Wikipedia is online at http://en.wikipedia.org/ (last
visited Mar. 4, 2010). See YocrAi BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRO-
DUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 70-74 (2006); CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES
EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING Wrmotrr ORGANIZATIONS 109-17 (2008).
12 The provisions of a small, but hopefully representative, sample of the many such li-
censes in existence are considered infra Parts II.B--C.
" What one observer said of open-source software could be applied more broadly to other
open-content communities: "In a very real sense, the open source community figures out its
self-definition by arguing about licenses and the associated notions of property, what is worth
protecting, that they embody." WEBER, supra note 9, at 85; see also id. at 185 (an open-source
license "is not simply a set of legal definitions and restrictions. Rather, the license represents
foundational beliefs about the constitutional principles of a community and evolving knowl-
edge about how to make it work.").
2010]
Harvard Journal on Legislation
licensed works and impose enforceable conditions upon the exercise of those
rights. 14
The ongoing vitality of "commons-based peer production"' 5 of infor-
mational goods depends critically upon the assumption that the governing
licenses will make earlier users' contributions freely available in perpetuity
for later users to copy, modify, and redistribute. 6 The termination provisions
of the Copyright Act, however, may call that assumption into doubt. Nothing
more definitive may yet be said, for the peer-production phenomenon is suf-
ficiently recent that issues of termination have not yet arisen. 7 The courts
have not considered, for example, whether a computer programmer may re-
lease software code to the public under commonly used software licenses
such as the GNU General Public License ("GPL") s or the BSD License, 9
and then "terminate" that license many years later and recapture all of the
exclusive rights that ordinarily accompany ownership of copyright in a
work. Nor has precedent established whether the author of an expressive
work published under a Creative Commons license 0 may later terminate the
license and sue anyone who distributes or remixes the work (in reliance on
the stated terms of the license) for copyright infringement. Nor do we know,
to take the most extreme example, whether an author may use the statute's
termination provisions to rescind her own express dedication of a work to
the public domain, 21 although countervailing policy considerations may
weigh particularly heavily against allowing termination in this instance.22
The point is simply that the Copyright Act's termination clauses may, by
their terms, reach some or all of these situations, even though none of these
scenarios presents the problem of unequal bargaining power that motivated
Congress to enact the termination provisions. Particularly when one consid-
ers that the Copyright Act allows persons other than the original author to
terminate a license in some circumstances, 23 the possibilities for gamesman-
"4 See infra notes 277-85 and accompanying text.
'" This is Yochai Benkler's useful formulation, which concisely encapsulates a number of
complex analytical constructs. See BENKLER, supra note 11, at 59-132; Yochai Benkler,
Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 375 (2002).
16 See, e.g., infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
17 The first version of the GNU General Public License ("GPL") for software, for exam-
ple, was issued in 1989. See FREE SorwARE FOUND., GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LicENSE VER-
SION 1.0 (1989), http://www.gnu.orgllicenses/old-licenses/gpl-l.O.txt [hereinafter GPLvl]. As
discussed below, the most likely applicable statutory termination provisions do not take effect
until thirty-five years after the execution of the transfer or license. See infra note 244 and
accompanying text. It will be some years, in other words, before the earliest works licensed
under GPLvl become subject to possible termination. See infra notes 294-96 and accompany-
ing text.
18 See infra notes 50-76 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
20 See infra Part II.C.2.
21 See infra Parts lII.A.2-3.
22 See infra notes 311-12 and accompanying text.
23 See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
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ship and abuse of the termination regime in the realm of open-content works
appear substantial.
An author's termination of an open-content license would present a host
of practical difficulties. Rapid evolution characterizes many of the works
created under such licenses, and untangling a terminating author's long-ago
contributions from the contemporary version of a work may represent an
exceedingly complex undertaking. In addition, open-content works often in-
clude contributions from many authors-thousands, or even millions, in the
case of large-scale projects like Linux or Wikipedia-and the task of excis-
ing a terminating author's contributions while simultaneously preserving
later users' contributions would prove particularly vexing.
Even aside from these practical considerations, termination would un-
doubtedly chill the vibrant creative environment that presently surrounds the
development and use of open-content works. It would likely surprise later
contributors to the project who had been led to believe that earlier users'
contributions would remain available for reuse in perpetuity (and whose own
contributions may well have been made in reliance on that understanding). It
would also present a clear affront to the community norms of nonproprie-
tization and mutual sharing that characterize a number of the most vibrant
open-content projects.
For all these reasons, the Copyright Act's termination provisions make a
poor fit with open-content works. Because those provisions nevertheless ap-
pear on their face to permit termination of open-content licenses, clarifica-
tion or revision of the law is necessary. Although some judge-made
doctrines may be pressed into service towards this end, courts may be under-
standably reluctant to depart from what would appear to be plain statutory
text. Therefore, protections against termination for open-content works may
find firmer grounding in new legislation.
Part II of this Article will illustrate the variety of copyright licensing
arrangements that underlie the peer-production phenomenon. The objective
here is not to advance normative claims about the strengths or weaknesses of
peer production as a mode of creative endeavor or to contrast it favorably or
unfavorably with the more traditional proprietary model of production. This
assessment occurs instead at an analytically "lower" level. It takes the peer-
production phenomenon as a given and examines the particular licensing
arrangements that bind open-content projects and their creators together.
Given the dozens, or even hundreds, of model licensing instruments in exis-
tence, this inquiry can do no more than summarize a few of the most widely
used alternatives, including the GPL and BSD Licenses for software and the
GNU Free Documentation License ("GFDL") and Creative Commons fam-
ily of licenses for works of other types.
Part III then situates the licensing issue within federal copyright law.
The termination clauses represent only one way in which the Copyright Act
has evolved to make it more difficult for creators to make irrevocable grants
of rights in their works to others. This portion of the Article considers, as
2010]
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illustrative of the complexities introduced by the evolving statute, whether
authors may expressly abandon copyright in their works and dedicate them
to the public domain-a question that can no longer be answered unequivo-
cally in the affirmative. After surveying the changes Congress has made to
vest rights inextricably in the hands of authors, the analysis turns to a con-
sideration of the statute's complex provisions governing the termination of
licenses and transfers. The evolution of these provisions in the legislation
that ultimately became the Copyright Act of 1976, and the pattern of case
law construing those provisions, both show that Congress's attention was
focused on redressing unremunerative transfers made by authors in the face
of superior bargaining power:24 a policy that, whatever its normative appeal,
clearly has no application to the peer-production phenomenon. The need to
address the termination issue draws added force from recent cases applying
traditional copyright principles to open-content licenses.
With both the technical and legal aspects of the issue on the table, Part
IV considers whether existing doctrine is sufficiently flexible to accommo-
date a judge-made exception to the statutory termination regime for open-
content works. A few tools are available to courts inclined to protect open-
content licensees from the prospect of termination by the licensor. The
courts might, for example, modify the existing doctrine of copyright aban-
donment to permit partial, conditional, irrevocable abandonments of copy-
right rights, to the permanent detriment of authors and their heirs.
Alternatively, the courts might extend their current practice of borrowing
provisions from the Patent Act when construing the Copyright Act.25 The
Patent Act presently includes several provisions that permit creators ex-
pressly to abandon rights in their creations and dedicate their works perma-
nently to the public domain.26 Courts might interpret the Copyright Act
harmoniously with these provisions of the Patent Act as a way of sidestep-
ping the problems that termination of an open-content copyright license
would pose. Neither of these solutions, however, is optimal; either would
require a reviewing court to disregard seemingly forceful counterarguments,
and a court's receptivity to arguments grounded either in a reformulated
abandonment doctrine or in the Patent Act cannot be known with certainty in
advance. Such unpredictability, however, only multiplies the present uncer-
tainty surrounding the durability and permanence of open-content licenses.
With no compelling judicial alternatives in view, Part V considers leg-
islative solutions. Congress should recognize the peer production phenome-
non as an essential change in the baseline assumptions that prevailed at the
time of the Copyright Act of 1976-a change that demands its own recogni-
tion in positive law. The better approach, accordingly, would be for Con-
2 See infra notes 231-40 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 337-47 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 330, 333-36 and accompanying text.
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gress to amend the statute to place open-content licenses outside the reach of
the Copyright Act's termination clauses.
11. OPEN-CONTENT LICENSING
A. The Public Benefit of Open-Content Licenses
In recent years, a vast body of content has been created and distributed
under licenses that grant unspecified members of the public rights that, by
statute, ordinarily belong to the copyright holder alone. Before discussing
the specifics of a few such licenses, it is useful to identify some important
commonalities that most open-content licenses share.
First, and most fundamentally, all open-content licenses authorize oth-
erwise unlawful conduct: that is, they expressly permit users of the licensed
works to perform actions that would otherwise infringe the licensor's copy-
right. Absent authorization (or other legal excuse such as fair or de minimis
use), reproducing,27 distributing, 28 or modifying29 a work infringes the au-
thor's copyright. Open-content licenses make such otherwise infringing ac-
tivities lawful and thereby facilitate uses of works that federal law would
ordinarily prohibit.
Second, all the open-content licenses considered herein are universally
available: the works are offered to all on equivalent terms30 without the need
for individualized bargaining. This is not, of course, to deny the possibility
of dual licensing: a prospective licensee dissatisfied with some of the condi-
tions of an open-content license may negotiate with the work's author for a
license on different terms.31 Absent dual licensing, however, a licensee who
27 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006) ("the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive
rights... to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords"); id. § 101 (defining
"copies" and "phonorecords").
28 Id. § 106(3) (conferring upon copyright owner "the exclusive rights ... to distribute
copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public" via enumerated means).
29 Id. § 106(2) (conferring upon copyright owner "the exclusive rights ... to prepare
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work"); id. § 101 (defining "derivative work").
30 One might imagine a licensing regime that permits copying or modification only by
members of a defined group, of course. See BENKIER, supra note 11, at 61; Lee Anne Fennell,
Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. Rav. 1403, 1430 n.131 (2009) (differentiating "limited-
access commons" from "open-access resources"). None of the licensing arrangements consid-
ered herein, however, has this feature-which is unsurprising in view of the participation-
maximizing goals that most open-content projects share. See, e.g., ERIC S. RAYMOND, The
Cathedral and the Bazaar, in THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND
OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 9, at 27, 41-44.
31 See Bruce Perens, How Many Open Source Licenses Do You Need?, DATAMATION, Feb.
16, 2009, http://itmanagement.earthweb.com/osrc/article.php/12068_3803101 _1/Bruce-Per
ens-How-Many-Open-Source-Licenses-Do-You-Need.htm (last visited May 4, 2010). To be
sure, this task may become infeasible as the number of authors of the licensed work increases.
It probably is not realistic, for example, to expect a prospective licensee to negotiate a non-
GPL license for the Linux kernel given the huge number of contributors to that project whose
assent would be necessary. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO.
L.J. 885, 941-42 (2008) (explaining how need to secure assent of "thousands (perhaps tens of
2010]
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is willing to observe the conditions stated in an open-content license is free
to use the work without the particularized approval of (and indeed, without
notice to) the licensor. An unavoidable consequence is that an open-content
licensor ordinarily has no way of knowing the identities of all the licensees,
for the parties to the license may never communicate.
Third, the universal availability of the content on the terms stated in the
license minimizes transaction costs. Open-content licenses are available "off
the shelf' to accommodate several types of concerns that may confront users
of the licensed works.32 Use of the works in a fashion consistent with the
license entails no greater burden than reading the license; there is no need to
incur the expense of negotiating an individual usage agreement (again, as-
suming that the licensee is satisfied with the conditions stated in the license).
Even the burden of reading the license, moreover, is minimized, because a
relatively small number of standard-form licenses govern a wide variety of
projects available from different open-content suppliers.33 There is, corre-
spondingly, a diminished need to become familiar with particularized license
terms that may vary from one vendor to the next outside the open-content
domain.
Finally, combining the foregoing characteristics yields the defining fea-
ture of all open-content licenses: they promote freedom. Open-content li-
censes expressly authorize a large community of users, at their sole election
and without further negotiation or expense, to use a variety of works in a
manner that would otherwise infringe copyright. In doing so, the licenses
facilitate at least some uses that would not otherwise occur. The licenses
create, in economic terms, a commons: a pool of raw materials upon which
members of the public are free to draw for their own consumptive or produc-
tive ends.34
The public domain presents a possibly more familiar model of such a
commons. Any creator is free to draw from public-domain materials and to
incorporate them into her own creation." A growing literature recognizes the
thousands) of contributing users" inhibits relicensing of Linux). But cf infra notes 141-47 and
accompanying text (describing recent successful effort to relicense Wikipedia).32 See Perens, supra note 31.
3 See, e.g., infra note 50 and accompanying text.
34 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 14-15 (2003); BENKLER, supra note 11, at 60-62.
" See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2003)
("The rights of a patentee or copyright holder are part of a carefully crafted bargain under
which, once the patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or
work at will and without attribution." (internal quotations and citation omitted)); Golan v.
Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1193 (10th Cir. 2007) ("each member of the public ... has a non-
exclusive right, subject to constitutionally permissible legislation, to use material in the public
domain"); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 710 (2d Cir. 1992) (recog-
nizing that software developers are free to incorporate public-domain materials and techniques
into their programs).
There is, as others have recognized, not a single "public domain," but many, the contours of
which vary depending on the purpose for which the term is used. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 38-39 (2008); Pamela Samuelson,
[Vol. 47
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beneficial effects on creative production from the existence and availability
of freely usable public-domain works. By reducing the costs creators must
pay to reuse others' creations in their own, a rich commons pays public divi-
dends in the form of greater production of expressive works.36 As discussed
below, however, changes to U.S. copyright law over the past three decades
have tended to restrict the entry of new works into the public domain.37 If a
robust public domain fuels creativity, the strengthening of private property
rights may have the opposite effect-they may increase authors' costs and
deter future creativity,3" creating what Michael Heller calls "the tragedy of
the anticommons."3 9 The parallel rise of the open-content movement, which
leverages existing copyright and contract principles to create a new com-
mons outside the public domain,40 might be seen as a reaction to the exces-
sive expansion of property rights into fields of intellectual and creative
Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DuKE L.J. 783 (2006) (developing a valuable
taxonomy of the many senses in which the term "public domain" is commonly used). This
Article adheres to the conventional understanding of the term as signifying works that are not
presently under copyright, irrespective of whether they may have been copyrighted at one time
or whether they were ever eligible for copyright protection at all. As the discussion of the
copyright abandonment doctrine below suggests, however, even this relatively settled usage
may blur into uncertainty at the margins. See infra Part III.A.2.
36 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of
"Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REv. 462, 548 (1998) ("[S]ocial benefit accrues from the
rights to access and use unprotected, public domain elements of existing works .... These
rights and practices lead to the development of creative and scholarly talents and, ultimately, to
the creation of new works ...."); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965,
968 (1990) ("The public domain should be understood not as the realm of material that is
undeserving of protection, but as a device that permits the rest of the system to work by
leaving the raw material of authorship available for authors to use.").
37 See infra Part III.A. .
" As one judge famously put it:
Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it. Creativity is
impossible without a rich public domain. Nothing today, likely nothing since we
tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like science and technology, grows by accre-
tion, each new creator building on the works of those who came before. Overprotec-
tion stifles the very creative forces it's supposed to nurture.
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissent-
ing from denial of rehearing en banc); see also BENKLER, supra note 11, at 38 ("If we pass a
law that regulates information production too strictly, allowing its beneficiaries to impose
prices that are too high on today's innovators, then we will have not only too little consumption
of information today, but also too little production of new information for tomorrow.");
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 34, at 66-70.
39 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, Ill HARv. L. REV. 621 (1998); see also MICHAL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK
ECONOMY: How Too MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, SToPs INNOVATION, AND COSTS
LIVES 9-16 (2008) (offering illustrative examples from copyright); ERIc VON HIPPEL, DEMOC-
RATIZING INNOVATION 112-15 (2005) (describing how strong intellectual property rights en-
able market incumbents to slow competitors' innovation).
40 See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 62-66 (2003) (differentiating several features of
contractually constructed information commons from the pure public domain); Lawrence Les-
sig, Re-Crafting a Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 56, 74 (2006) (distinguishing the
free reuse of works under open-content licenses from "the public domain"); Samuelson, supra
note 35, at 799-802 (same).
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endeavor,4' and a conscious effort to provide an alternative supply of expres-
sive resources for future authors.
The public derives at least two identifiable benefits from works pro-
duced under open-content licenses. First, perhaps most obviously, open-con-
tent works may be consumed without fear of liability. Individuals may freely
use software, 42 or listen to (or share) music 43 issued under open-content li-
censes (assuming, as always, that any applicable conditions in the accompa-
nying licenses are observed). This is a particularly valuable benefit insofar as
it aligns with internet-user norms, which have favored the sharing and reuse
of works even in the face of legal threats. 44 Second, making works available
for use under open-content licenses has a multiplier effect, permitting the
creation of new works which may never have come into existence absent the
raw materials that the licenses place into the commons.45 These benefits to
the public, in turn, help to justify legal protections for the creators and users
of open-content works against the uncertainty of termination.
4, See Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 183
(2004).
42 In the context of software, legal uncertainty presently surrounds the question whether
the mere use of a program without authorization (even if no further copying or distribution of
the program occurs) may infringe copyright in the work. Compare MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak
Computer Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) (temporarily loading program into computer's
RAM memory without authorization infringes copyright), with Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC
Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127-28 (2d Cir. 2008) (declining to apply MAI where data was
stored in computer memory for only a short time). See also 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2006) (creating
statutory exceptions to copyright infringement liability for several common uses of computer
programs, perhaps inviting negative inference that uses not expressly covered by the excep-
tions are infringing); Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 Nw. U. L. REv. (forthcom-
ing 2010).
43 The courts have sternly condemned the sharing of copyrighted music over peer-to-peer
networks, minting new legal theories and voiding existing defenses to hold defendants liable.
See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (creating
new theory of liability for inducement of copyright infringement in file-sharing case); BMG
Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting fair use defense in file-sharing
case); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); see also
WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF EN-
TERTAINMENT 116-19 (2004) (arguing that Napster court misapplied the fair use doctrine);
Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2537, 2588-92 (2009) (argu-
ing that some personal uses, such as the use at issue in Gonzalez, ordinarily should either
receive broad fair use protection or be deemed outside the regulatory scope of copyright
altogether).
"See Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us
About Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 26 BERKELEY ThCH. L.J. 651, 654 & nn.4-5
(2006); cf John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap,
2007 UTAH L. REv. 537, 543-47 (2007) (offering multiple examples of seemingly benign
conduct that a strict reading of the law nevertheless makes punishable as copyright
infringement).
41 Indeed, some open-content licenses create a ripple effect on this point by mandating
that derivative works prepared from the open-content work must themselves be released as
open content also. See infra notes 64-71, 111, 128 and accompanying text. But cf ORGANISA-
TION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. ("OECD"), PARTICIPATIVE WEB AND USER-CREATED
CONTENT: WEB 2.0, WIKIs AND SOCIAL NETWORKING 83 (2007) (calling for further study to
assess the net effects of open-content licensing on creative production).
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B. Open-Content Licensing: Software
The contemporary peer-production phenomenon began in the software
world in the 1970s and 1980s,' 4 with later open-content projects modeling
themselves on the paradigm established by free and open-source software
("FOSS"). 47 Software licensing, accordingly, supplies the logical starting
point for an examination of the legal underpinnings of commons-based peer
production. Although dozens of standard-form licenses exist for FOSS
works,4s many of them share a common intellectual ancestor: the GNU Pro-
ject's celebrated GPL.49
1. The GNU GPL and LGPL
In the FOSS world, the GNU GPL is the most widely used license. 0
There have been three versions of the GPL: Version 1, which was promul-
46 The Unix operating system, which was developed at AT&T Corporation's Bell Labs
beginning in 1969, was widely adopted by scientific and educational institutions under quite
liberal licensing terms in the 1970s. See WEBER, supra note 9, at 25-29. As Unix's popularity
grew, AT&T sensed an opportunity to capitalize on rising demand, and in the late 1970s it took
several steps aimed at maximizing the commercial value of Unix, including dramatically rais-
ing its licensing fees and imposing new restrictions on licensees' authority to redistribute the
operating system's source code. See id. at 38-39, 44-46. Rising proprietization of software
sparked a backlash, led at MIT by programmer Richard Stallman, who in 1983 founded the
Free Software Foundation ("FSF") and the following year launched the "GNU" (short for
"GNU's Not Unix") Project with the goal of producing a complete operating system free from
proprietary constraints. See id. at 46-48.
" The label "free and open-source" is commonly used to pass over an internal squabble
that exists in the nonproprietary software community, but which lacks significance for most
analyses of that community's operations and product, including the present one. In brief, par-
tisans of "free software" see avoiding proprietary or commercial entanglements as a moral
imperative, while advocates of "open-source" view performance and technological superiority
rather than ethics as the key issues. See BENKLER, supra note 11, at 66 (noting the dispute);
Jos6 J. GonzAlez, Open Source, Free Software, and Contractual Issues, 15 TEx. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 157, 178-85 (2007) (same); ERIC S. RAYMOND, Homesteading the Noosphere, in THE
CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL
REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 9, at 79, 83-84 (emphasizing "pragmatism" of "open source"
advocates); RICHARD M. STALLMAN, Why "Free Software" is Better than "Open Source", in
FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 55-60 (Joshua
Gay ed., 2002) (advocating moral superiority of "free software"); Vetter, supra note 10, at 298
(summarizing the debate).
. 48 "The Open Source initiative has, to date, approved 73 licenses" as compatible with the
project's Open Source Definition. Perens, supra note 31; see also Open Source Initiative
("OSI"), Open Source Definition (Annotated), http://www.opensource.org/docs/definition.php
(last visited Apr. 1, 2010). The FSF maintains its own, smaller, list of licenses that satisfy its
definition of "free software." See FSF, VARIOUS LICENSES AND COMMENTS ABOUT THEM
(2008), available at http://www.gnu.org/licenseslicense-list.html.
41 See BENKLER, supra note 11, at 65 (describing GPL as "a legal technique that started a
snowball rolling"); LAWRENCE LEssIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 147-48 (2006) (linking dyna-
mism of Linux development process to openness of source code guaranteed by the GPL);
WEBER, supra note 9, at 49 ("[T]he GPL was a major innovation ... [that] established a clear
social regime with specific principles and norms that defined free software.").
50 As of March 2010, the SourceForge online software repository indexed over 105,000
open-source software projects available under any version of the GPL. See SourceForge.net,
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gated in 1989 ("GPLvl");5' Version 2, in 1991 ("GPLv2");2 and Version 3,
in 2007 ("GPLv3").5 3 The various versions of the GPL do not displace or
supersede one another, and authors of FOSS works may select earlier ver-
sions of the GPL if those versions better reflect their intent.-
Although a FOSS author's use of the GPL effectively places the
software into the commons, thereby making it available for copying and
modification, GPL-licensed software is not in the public domain.5 Rather,
all GPL-licensed software is copyrighted.16 The Preamble of GPLv3 includes
Software Search, http://sourceforge.net/search/? (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (listing number of
projects by license status under "License" heading in left margin). A further 18,000 projects
were available under the LGPL license (discussed infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text)
and 12,000 under BSD-style licenses (discussed infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text).
See id.; see also Sapna Kumar, Enforcing the GNU GPL, 2006 J.L. TECH. & POL'v 1, 3 ("Be-
tween sixty-five and seventy percent of open-source software is GPL-licensed.").
5' See GPLvI, supra note 17.
52 See FSF, GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE, VERSION 2 (1991), available at http:/Iwww.
gnu.orglicenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.txt [hereinafter GPLv2].
"3 See FSF, GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE, VERSION 3 (2007), available at http://www.
gnu.orglicenses/gpl.html [hereinafter GPLv3]. For a review of the drafting process that pro-
duced the GPLv3-a distributed, international endeavor conducted over the Internet-see
Christopher M. DiLeo, Comment, "Bazaar" Transnational Drafting: An Analysis of the GNU
Public License Version 3 Revision Process, 10 SAN DIEGO ITrr'L L.J. 193 (2008).
" A division presently exists within the FOSS community between authors who are mi-
grating to GPLv3 and those who are continuing to license their works under GPLv2 due to
certain new conditions added in the GPLv3, such as a broadened patent-licensing clause and a
restriction on the use of GPL-licensed code in digital rights management technologies. See
Andrds Guadamuz-Gonzdilez, GNU General Public License v3: A Legal Analysis, 3 SCRIPTED
154 (2006) (critically reviewing changes introduced in GPLv3); see also Kumar, supra note
50, at 3 n.14 (quoting Linus Torvalds explaining why he will not adopt GPLv3 for the Linux
kernel). But cf Perens, supra note 31 (downplaying significance of GPLv2-versus-GPLv3
rift). The new provisions introduced in the GPLv3 are important to a full understanding of the
tradeoffs entailed by the license in practice, but will not be further considered herein.
" See Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1198 (1 1th Cir. 2001)
("[s]oftware distributed pursuant to [the GPL] is not necessarily ceded to the public do-
main"); Brian W. Carver, Share and Share Alike: Understanding and Enforcing Open Source
and Free Software Licenses, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 443, 469-70 (2005) (summarizing Ger-
man court ruling rejecting claim that GPL effectuated a waiver or abandonment of copyright);
Natalie Heineman, Computer Software Derivative Works: The Calm Before the Storm, 8 J.
HIGH TECH. L. 235, 262 (2008) ("Calling source code 'open' or 'free' under the GPL or its
equivalent may give the false impression that the copyright owner has waived her copyrights
in the work, thereby releasing the work into the public domain."); Joseph Scott Miller,
Allchin's Folly: Exploding Some Myths About Open Source Software, 20 CARDOZO ARTS &
Errr. L.J. 491, 496-97 (2002) ("In sharp contrast to placing a piece of software into the public
domain by utterly disclaiming copyright protection, using a free software license such as the
GPL prevents downstream recipients from using the software to create new programs for dis-
tribution under a closed source approach."); cf supra note 40 (recognizing other authorities
that distinguish contractually constructed information commons from public domain).
56 Issues surrounding the scope of copyright protection for software lie outside the present
inquiry, but would necessarily complicate any actual case involving possible infringement of a
GPL-licensed FOSS work. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693,
701-12 (2d Cir. 1992) (developing analytical methodology for identifying and excluding un-
protectable elements of work in software copyright infringement case); Pamela Samuelson,
Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes From the Scope of Its Protection, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1961-73 (2007) (reviewing history of copyright protection for software
and significance of 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006)).
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the following clause (versions of which also appeared in GPLv I and GPLv2)
explaining the function of the license: "Developers that use the GNU GPL
protect your rights with two steps: (1) assert copyright on the software, and
(2) offer you this License giving you legal permission to copy, distribute
and/or modify it.""7
Every version of the GPL grants users of the licensed software the
rights to engage in the otherwise-infringing acts of copying,58 modifying,5 9
and redistributing6° the licensed work. Like all open-content licenses, how-
ever, the GPL attaches conditions that limit the scope of the authorization
the license confers. A licensee's exercise of one of the rights granted by the
license (to copy, modify, or redistribute the work) without observing the
applicable conditions exceeds the licensee's authority, and renders that use
unauthorized (and, thus, infringing).6
Many of the GPL's conditions exist to inform downstream users about
the legal status of the work and to provide them with the resources necessary
to execute the rights granted under the license.62 To ensure that licensees are
able to exercise their power to alter the software, the GPLv3 mandates that
the software's source code also be made available whenever the software is
distributed in executable or binary form.63
" GPLv3, supra note 53, pmbl. (emphasis added); see also Miller, supra note 55, at 497
("The GPL does not destroy a software author's original copyright; rather, it is predicated
squarely upon it."); cf GPLvl, supra note 17, pmbl. ("We protect your rights with two steps:
(1) copyright the software, and (2) offer you this license which gives you legal permission to
copy, distribute and/or modify the software."); GPLv2, supra note 52, pmbl. (same).
51 See GPLvI, supra note 17, §§ 1, 3; GPLv2, supra note 52; GPLv3, supra note 53,
§§ 0, 2.
'9 See GPLvl, supra note 17, § 2; GPLv2, supra note 52; GPLv3, supra note 53, §§ 5, 6.
' See GPLvl, supra note 17, §§ 1, 3; GPLv2, supra note 52; GPLv3, supra note 53,
§§ 4, 6.
61 See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1379-83 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (copying of FOSS
work without complying with the terms of the governing license, if proved, would constitute
infringement of copyright); Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting,
Inc., 421 F.3d 1307, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (copyright infringement results if otherwise infring-
ing activity occurs without the copyright holder's authorization); ITOFCA, Inc. v. MegaTrans
Logistics, Inc., 322 F.3d 928, 940 (7th Cir. 2003) ("A licensee infringes the owner's copyright
if its use exceeds the scope of its license." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted));
Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 1998) (" '[i]f the nature of a licensee's violation
consists of a failure to satisfy a condition to the license ... it follows that the rights dependent
upon satisfaction of such condition have not been effectively licensed, and therefore, any use
by the licensee is without authority from the licensor and may therefore, constitute an infringe-
ment of copyright."' (citation omitted)); S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th
Cir. 1989). See generally GPLv3, supra note 53, § 9 ("nothing other than this License grants
you permission to propagate or modify any covered work. These actions infringe copyright if
you do not accept this License.").
62 See, e.g., GPLv3, supra note 53, §§ 4, 5 (requiring information about the license to be
conveyed with any verbatim or modified copies of the licensed work distributed by the
licensee).
63 See id. § 6.
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The so-called "copyleft" condition,64 a provision included in one form
or another since GPLv 1, limits the ability of authors of works derived from
GPL-licensed software to release their own work under licenses more re-
strictive than the GPL. In its current form, the provision requires authors of a
modified version of software derived from GPL-licensed code to "license
the entire work, as a whole, under this License to anyone who comes into
possession of a copy. This License will therefore apply ... to the whole of
the work, and all its parts, regardless of how they are packaged. 65
In a license document that otherwise celebrates freedom and choice, 66
the copyleft condition at first seems out of place. It limits, rather than en-
hances, one potentially important freedom enjoyed by users of the
software-the freedom to license derivative software works they create on
terms of their choosing. 67 It is surely this loss of freedom that underlies pejo-
rative labels, such as "viral" or "infectious," that critics sometimes use in
describing the GPL or other copyleft licenses. 6 As a programmer, using
GPL-licensed code in your own work makes you a FOSS author whether
you wish to be or not, because the copyleft condition "infects" your final
' See RICHARD M. STALLMAN, What is Copyleft?, in FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY,
supra note 47, at 89.
65 GPLv3, supra note 53, § 5(c). For earlier versions of the GPL's "copyleft" condition,
see GPLvl, supra note 17, § 2(b) ("You may modify your copy... and copy and distribute
such modifications . . . , provided that you also ... cause the whole of any work that you
distribute or publish, that in whole or in part contains the Program or any part thereof, either
with or without modifications, to be licensed at no charge to all third parties under the terms of
this... License (except that you may choose to grant warranty protection to some or all third
parties, at your option)."); GPLv2, supra note 52, § 2(b) ("You must cause any work that you
distribute or publish, that in whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or any
part thereof, to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third parties under the terms of this
License."). For a discussion of the interaction of the GPL's copyleft condition with the license
provisions requiring programmers to make source code available, see John Tsai, For Better or
Worse: Introducing the GNU General Public License Version 3, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 547,
564-68 (2008).
6 See GPLv3, supra note 53, pmbl. ("The licenses for most software and other practical
works are designed to take away your freedom to share and change the works. By contrast, the
GNU General Public License is intended to guarantee your freedom to share and change all
versions of a program-to make sure it remains free software for all its users.").
67 See James Grimmelmann, The Ethical Visions of Copyright Law, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
2005, 2028 (2009) ("the GPL makes you share source code because someone else shared it
with you ... free software licenses in general are incompatible with the default ethical vision
of commercial exchange, and copyleft licenses go further by restraining downstream authors
from taking part in the commercial exchange system as well"); cf Dov Greenbaum, Academia
to Industry Technology Transfer: An Alternative to the Bayh-Dole System for Both Developed
and Developing Nations, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & Err. L.J. 311, 404 (2009)
(recognizing "legitimate concerns that viral or infectious terms in an exclusive license may
serve as a disincentive to license").
' See, e.g., Dennis M. Kennedy, A Primer on Open Source Licensing Legal Issues: Copy-
right, Copyleft and Copyfuture, 20 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 345, 362-63 (2001); Ron Phil-
lips, Deadly Combinations: A Framework for Analyzing the GPL's Viral Effect, 25 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 487 (2008); Greg R. Vetter, "Infectious" Open Source
Software: Spreading Incentives or Promoting Resistance?, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 53 (2004); cf
Kumar, supra note 50, at 9 (criticizing labels like "viral" and "infectious" as resting on a
misunderstanding of the GPL).
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product, requiring it to be licensed under the GPL as well if it is distributed
to others.
Yet just as the law celebrates "those wise restraints that make us
free," 69 the GPL enhances far more freedom than it limits. The copyleft con-
dition feeds the commons. It ensures that FOSS works remain free even as
they evolve and protects earlier programmers against later programmers'
proprietary appropriation of their work. 70 Because the copyleft condition ap-
plies only to software derived from GPL-licensed code, it is sometimes la-
beled a "reciprocity" provision. In other words, the cost of reusing GPL-
licensed code in one's own work is that one must either offer that work to all
under the GPL, or offer it to no one.7
Although the GPL also includes what is labeled a "termination" provi-
sion,72 it is important not to confuse this clause with the issue under consid-
eration herein. The GPL provides, in essence, that if a licensee fails to honor
the conditions stated in the license (and fails thereafter to cure her default),
that licensee may not thereafter rely on the GPL as a defense to the original
licensor's claim of copyright infringement. In the language of the license, the
rights of a defaulting user are said to "terminate. '73 Stated differently, a user
may, by her conduct, forfeit the rights the GPL grants. This is a different
issue from the question that this Article considers, namely, whether the Cop-
yright Act permits unilateral termination of open-content licenses by the au-
thor (or the author's heirs) irrespective of any breach by the licensee.
Unless the licensee forfeits her rights by breaching a condition of the
GPL, however, the license is expressly declared to be perpetual: "All rights
granted under this License are granted for the term of copyright on the Pro-
' See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Nature and Importance of Liberty, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 3, 5-6 (2005) (quoting language traditionally used at Harvard Law School's graduation
ceremony).
70 See BENKLER, supra note 11, at 63-65; WEBER, supra note 9, at 85 ("Open source
intellectual property aims at creating a social structure that expands, not restricts, the com-
mons" and "promises to ratchet up the process over time as a 'commons' of raw materials
grows"); Eric E. Johnson, Rethinking Sharing Licenses for the Entertainment Media, 26 CAR-
DOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 404-O5 (2008). See generally STALLMAN, supra note 47.
"' See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software: Do Property Rights
Still Matter?, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 16 (2006); Christian H. Nadan, Open Source Licens-
ing: Virus or Virtue?, 10 TEx. INTELL. PRoP. L.J. 349, 359 (2002) ("requiring that any deriva-
tive works of GPL code also be covered by the GPL seems reasonable, since but for the GPL
license, the user would have no rights to create the derivative works in the first place"); Tsai,
supra note 65, at 551.
72 GPLv3, supra note 53, § 8 ("Any attempt... to propagate or modify" a GPL-licensed
work except as expressly provided under the GPL "is void, and will automatically terminate
your rights under this License"); see also GPLvl, supra note 17, § 4; GPLv2, supra note 52,§ 4. § See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants in License Contracts: Tales
from a Test of the Artistic License, 17 TEX. INTELL. PRoP. L.J. 335, 352 n.127 (2009) ("the best
reading of this provision is that it is simply a garden variety termination provision, providing
that in the event the licensee breaches the license contract, the licensee has no further rights to
exercise the rights granted in the license grant provisions"); Tsai, supra note 65, at 578 (ex-
plaining that GPLv3 introduced new opportunities for defaulting users to avoid termination by
curing default).
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gram, and are irrevocable provided the stated conditions are met." 7 4 This
guarantee makes explicit a promise of permanence that has always been im-
plicit in the peer-production model: it "assur[es] . . . developers that their
work could never be taken away from them,""5 but will remain in the com-
mons in perpetuity.76 It is precisely this assurance that the Copyright Act's
termination provisions may place in doubt.
A GPL variant used for some FOSS works, the GNU Lesser General
Public License ("LGPL"), incorporates most of the provisions of the GPL. 77
The key difference is that the LGPL relaxes the GPL's copyleft condition as
applied to application programs dynamically linked 78 to LGPL-licensed li-
brary code. This waiver from the GPL's strict copyleft condition is believed
to encourage the commercial use of LGPL-licensed content.
79
7' GPLv3, supra note 53, § 2 (emphasis added). Earlier versions of the GPL were silent
on this point. See Kennedy, supra note 68, at 373.
71 SHIRKY, supra note 11, at 273.
76 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, De-bugging Open Source Software Licensing, 64 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 75, 83-84 (2002) ("The GPL makes creative use of a contract to reverse the
copyright monopoly by permanently giving away the exclusive rights of a copyright holder,
what Stallman whimsically calls 'copyleft."'); Johnson, supra note 70, at 404 ("The GPL
dedicates software in perpetuity to a regime in which it must be shared with others."); Daniel
B. Ravicher, Facilitating Collaborative Software Development: The Enforceability of Mass-
Market Public Software Licenses, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11, 67 (2000) (Copyleft condition
"achieves the goal of ensuring that all copies or modifications of the program are forever
publicly licensed"); Mitchell L. Stoltz, Note, The Penguin Paradox: How the Scope of Deriva-
tive Works in Copyright Affects the Effectiveness of the GNU GPL, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1439,
1475 (2005) ("The GPL guarantees that source code will be perpetually available, and this
guarantee is an important part of GPL software's commercial value."). This is certainly how
the GPL has been understood within the FOSS community. See, e.g., Jay Michaelson, There's
No Such Thing as a Free (Software) Lunch: What Every Developer Should Know About Open
Source Licensing, QUEUE, May 2004, at 41, 42 ("GPL partisans like to call it a 'protective
license' because it ensures that code covered by it will remain open source forever."); Chris
Maxcer, Free Software Licensing, Part 2: Beyond GPL, LINux INSIDER, July 27, 2007, http:/
www.linuxinsider.comlstory/58530.html ("Basically, though, GPL v2 and v3's key point is to
make the code 'free forever."').
77 See FSF, GNU LESSER GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE, VERSION 3 (2007), available at http://
www.gnu.org/licenses/lgpl.html [hereinafter LGPLv3]. The Preamble of the current version
of the LGPL states, in part, that "[t]his version of the GNU Lesser General Public License
incorporates the terms and conditions of version 3 of the GNU General Public License, supple-
mented by the additional permissions listed" in the remainder of the LGPL. LGPLv3, supra,
pmbl. Use of the LGPL is presently discouraged by the license's drafters; the Free Software
Foundation suggests that FOSS authors use the GPL instead, unless a compelling reason for
adopting the LGPL exists. See FSF, WHY You SHOULDN'T USE THE LESSER GPL FOR YOUR
NEXT LIBRARY (2007), available at http://www.gnu.org/licenses/why-not-lgpl.html [hereinaf-
ter WHY YOU SHOULDN'T USE THE LGPL].
78 "Dynamic linking" refers to a software development technique that makes the function-
ality of a library accessible to an application program while running without actually copying
the library's object code into the application's object code. See Stoltz, supra note 76, at 1449.
Dynamic linking is believed to offer some technical advantages because the library may be
updated separately from the application programs that rely on it and its improved functionality
made available to all application programs that link to the library without requiring the appli-
cations themselves to be updated. See id. at 1449-50.
" See, e.g., Carver, supra note 55, at 459-60; Lothar Determann, Dangerous Liaisons-
Software Combinations as Derivative Works?: Distribution, Installation, and Execution of
Linked Programs Under Copyright Law, Commercial Licenses, and the GPL, 21 BERKELEY
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2. BSD Licenses
In the late 1970s, a group of computer scientists and graduate students
at the University of California-Berkeley created the Berkeley Software Dis-
tribution ("BSD"), a small collection of software tools they had written for
the Unix operating system. Over time, BSD expanded to become a full-
fledged Unix-compatible operating system in its own right.80 BSD was is-
sued under the BSD License, which lent its name to a family of software
licenses collectively known today as "BSD-style" licenses.81
BSD-style licenses are models of brevity compared with the GPL. They
mandate an express copyright notice acknowledging the owner and year of
the work82 and authorize "[r]edistribution and use" of the licensed software
"in source and binary forms, with or without modification[.] '83 This author-
ization is subject to only three conditions:
" for software works distributed in the form of source code, the distri-
bution must include the copyright notice, the listing of conditions
from the license template, and a paragraph disclaiming warranties or
liability based in contract or tort;
" for software works distributed in the form of object code, those same
items must be included in the accompanying documentation; and
" for either type of work, the name of the owner's organization or its
contributors may not be employed in a manner that suggests endorse-
ment or promotion of products derived from the licensed software. 84
TECH. L.J. 1421, 1488 & n.255 (2006) (same); Dusollier, supra note 8, at 1418 (noting this
benefit, although questioning the LGPL's premise that dynamic linking creates a derivative
work); Stoltz, supra note 76, at 1452. But cf WHY You SHOULDN'T USE THE LGPL, supra note
77 (encouraging FOSS developers to release software libraries under the GPL rather than the
LGPL precisely to forbid proprietary software works from linking to the library).
80 See WEBER, supra note 9, at 29-35, 39-42. Legal threats from AT&T in the 1990s,
culminating in a lawsuit against the University of California, slowed the pace of BSD develop-
ment. Id. at 49-52; see also David McGowan, Between Logic and Experience: Error Costs
and United States v. Microsoft Corp., 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1185, 1204-07 (2005) (re-
counting history of BSD).
"' A BSD-style license template is available at http://www.opensource.org/licenses/bsd-
license.php (last visited Mar. 4, 2010) [hereinafter BSD License]. As there noted, the particu-
lar provisions of the BSD license and its variant forms have changed over time, although in
ways that are largely not pertinent to the present analysis. BSD licensing is widely used in
FOSS projects, although less commonly than the GPL and LGPL. See supra note 50 and
accompanying text. The "three-clause" standard-form BSD-style license described herein
meets both OSI's Open Source Definition and the FSF's definition of "free software." See
supra note 48. A "four-clause" variant, seldom employed today, is not compatible with the
FOSS definitions of either OSI or FSF. See infra note 84.
82 BSD License, supra note 81 (providing notice of the form "Copyright (c) <YEAR>,
<OWNER>. All rights reserved."). "<YEAR>" and "<OWNER>" represent variables
that are to be replaced with the values appropriate for the licensed work when the work is
distributed. Express copyright notices of this type are no longer required as a condition of
copyright protection, but are permitted, under U.S. and international copyright law. See infra
note 171 and accompanying text.
8 BSD License, supra note 81.
8 See id. This last requirement is omitted from the "Simplified BSD License," a variant
used by some BSD-derived projects. Id. A former version of the BSD License included a
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Because they require crediting the owner but omit other limitations on
the copying, modification, or redistribution of the licensed works, BSD-style
licenses are often characterized (with tolerable, if imperfect, accuracy) as
"attribution-only" licenses.8 What the BSD-style licenses omit, moreover,
is at least as important as what they require. BSD licenses are not reciprocal
licenses and have no "copyleft" condition. 6 Nor do they require source code
to be distributed with the software.87 Because derivatives of BSD-licensed
works need not be licensed under a BSD-style license (or any other recog-
nized FOSS license) and need not include source code, BSD-derived code
may be freely incorporated into proprietary software works distributed in
binary-only form.88
3. Open-Source Licensing: Constraint and Liberation
The GPL, the LGPL, and BSD-style licenses serve as useful examples
from the broader universe of FOSS licenses because of their very different
presumptions and effects. They represent points along a continuum which
can be viewed from either of two directions.
The licenses might first be characterized according to the constraining
force they exert on downstream users of the licensed works. The BSD li-
cense is minimally constraining; beyond the obligations to recognize the
original author's copyright and to refrain from implying endorsement or pro-
motion, the license places no limitations on a user's copying, modification,
or distribution of the work, including for profit.8 9 At the opposite extreme,
the GPL is maximally constraining, regulating not only how a work may be
fourth condition, the so-called "advertising clause," requiring the crediting of the University
of California-Berkeley in advertising materials for any BSD-derived product. This clause was
deleted from the standard-form BSD license in 1999, leaving the three conditions stated in the
text. See id..
85 See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 68, at 490; Greg R. Vetter, Commercial Free and Open
Source Software: Knowledge Production, Hybrid Appropriability, and Patents, 77 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2087, 2096, 2097-98 (2009); cf Zittrain, supra note 9, at 269 ("The BSD license
materially differs from a wholly public domain release only in that it requires a particular kind
of credit or attribution for the original author on whose work the new program is based."). For
a discussion of the reputational interests of authors of BSD-licensed software projects, see
Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It's Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 49,
90-91 (2006). Labeling BSD-style licenses as "attribution-only" seems to misapprehend the
significance of the license's third clause, which requires nonattribution in situations where
crediting the owner's organization would carry an implication of endorsement. Cf Jane C.
Ginsburg, The Author's Place in the Future of Copyright, 45 WILLAMErrE L. REV. 381, 391
(2009) (noting reputational interests of FOSS authors in not being associated with later users'
"ill-conceived or badly-executed changes to the underlying program.").
SBSD License, supra note 81; cf supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
87 See David S. Evans & Anne Layne-Farrar, Software Patents and Open Source. The
Battle over Intellectual Property Rights, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 10, 22 (2004).
' See James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 203
(2005); Fabrizio Marrella & Christopher S. Yoo, Is Open Source Software the New Lex Mer-
catoria?, 47 VA. J. INr. L. 807, 823 (2007); Phillips, supra note 68, at 490; Vetter, supra note
85, at 2097-98.
9 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
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reused, but also how derivatives of the work may be licensed.90 The GPL
thus effectively forbids proprietary or commercial adaptations of GPL-li-
censed code. The LGPL falls somewhere between, but still effectively per-
mits commercial reuse via linking to an LGPL-licensed library.91 These three
paradigms raise essential questions, such as whether or not attribution should
be required, whether derivative works should be required to be licensed
under similar terms, and whether commercial reuse of the licensed content
ought to be allowed. These questions recur in open-content licensing even
outside the software context. 92 The issue is thus not whether to constrain
users' behavior, for all licenses constrain (even if only by maintaining extrin-
sic constraints imposed by copyright law), 93 but rather which constraints a
licensor finds best to effectuate her intent.
The same group of licenses might also be evaluated not for how they
affect individual users, but for how they affect the commons. BSD-style li-
censes are essentially agnostic on the question of growing the commons.
Developers may add software to the pool, but anyone else is free to incorpo-
rate the licensed content into a proprietary product and need not make their
own contributions available for others to reuse. 94 In contrast, the GPL's reci-
procity provision demands that what is borrowed from the commons be re-
turned to the commons: modified versions of GPL-licensed software may be
distributed only under the GPL (with source code) for universal copying and
I See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
9' See Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Scope of Open Source Licensing, 21 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 20, 22 (2005) (labeling BSD-style licenses "unrestrictive," the LGPL "restrictive," and
the GPL "highly restrictive"). Bruce Perens, a software developer and influential advocate in
the FOSS community, labels these three licensing paradigms "gift" (BSD), "sharing with
rules" (GPL), and "in-between" (LPGL). See Perens, supra note 31. Perens actually cites the
Apache License, version 2.0, not the BSD license, as the paradigmatic "gift license." The
Apache License differs from BSD-style licenses in a number of respects that are unimportant
for present purposes.
92 See infra Part II.C.
9' See, e.g., Adam Kubelka & Matthew Fawcett, No Free Beer-Practice Tips for Open
Source Licensing, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 797, 813 (2006)
("[r]egardless of which type of license is applicable, all licenses contain downstream obliga-
tions on distributors."); Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 275, 287 (2003) (characterizing software license as "a soup-to-nuts statement of the
scope of legitimate behavior by a user or consumer of that software"); Van Houweling, supra
note 31, at 935-39 (noting that software licenses often aim to constrain behaviors that copy-
right law leaves unregulated).
9 As one of the leading minds behind the GPLv3, supra note 53, explained:
The BSD license says: "Here is a commons. It is not defended by copyright against
appropriation. Everything in the commons may be taken and put into proprietary,
non-commons production as easily as it may be incorporated in commons produc-
tion. We encourage people to put material into commons, and we are indifferent as to
whether the appropriative use made of commons resources is proprietary, or com-
mons-reinforcing."
Eben Moglen, Freeing the Mind: Free Software and the Death of Proprietary Culture, 56 ME.
L. REv. 1, 6 (2004).
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modification. 95 Again, the LGPL stands in between, excusing compliance
with the GPL's copyleft condition in some circumstances.
Comparing the licenses' effects along these two dimensions illuminates
the underlying bias of contemporary copyright law in favor of proprietary
production. Creating a commons of freely reusable works can be accom-
plished only with licenses that constrain the commons-defeating features of
current law. The default positions of copyright law tend to reflect assump-
tions that emphasize individual production under a strongly proprietary re-
gime.96 Those proprietary defaults have only strengthened over time.9 7 FOSS
licenses inevitably reflect that underlying copyright regime even as they
work to construct an alternative. The GPL, for example, aims to make FOSS
works freely reusable by restricting behaviors (such as releasing software in
binary-only form or incorporating it into proprietary products) that, although
not forbidden by copyright law, inhibit the growth of the commons. The
GPL backs its commons-creating mandates with the threat of liability for
copyright infringement if they are breached, 9 thereby cleverly inverting the
proprietary architecture of copyright to preserve a domain free from proprie-
tary. control. 99 BSD-style licenses, in contrast, impose fewer constraints on
" In Professor Moglen's words:
The GPL says: We construct a protected commons, in which by a trick, an irony, the
phenomena of commons are adduced through the phenomena of copyright, restricted
ownership is employed to create non-restricted self-protected commons .... It says:
'Take this software; do what you want with it-copy, modify, redistribute. But if
you distribute, modified or unmodified, do not attempt to give anybody to whom you
distribute fewer rights than you had in the material with which you began. Have a
nice day!"
Moglen, supra note 94, at 6. For a discussion of a few (largely inconclusive) cases in which the
plaintiff relied on violation of the GPL as support for its claim of copyright infringement, see
Clark D. Asay, The General Public License Version 3.0: Making or Breaking the FOSS Move-
ment?, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 265, 285 & nn.86-87 (2008); Joseph B. Baker,
Note, Contracting to Supplement Fair Use Doctrine, 39 U. MEM. L. REv. 757, 788-89 (2009);
Brad Frazer, Open Source is Not Public Domain: Evolving Licensing Philosophies, 45 IDAHO
L. REV. 349, 372-73 (2009); Vetter, supra note 10, at 299-300 & n.66; Jason B. Wacha,
Taking the Case: Is the GPL Enforceable?, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
451, 470 (2005).
9 See infra Part uI.A. I (discussing evolution of copyright default rules-that is to say, the
rules that apply absent agreement by the affected parties). For an argument that some of copy-
right's default rules are not subject to alteration by private agreement, see Mark A. Lemley,
Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REv.
111, 141-42 (1999) (citing the statute's provision on termination of transfers as an example of
an unalterable default rule).
9' See BENKLER, supra note 11, at 439-44 (noting both legislative and judge-made expan-
sions of property rights in copyrighted works); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG
MEDIA UsEs TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIV-
rry 130-39 (2004).
98 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
9 See BENKLER, supra note 11, at 65 ("the legal jujitsu Stallman used [in the GPL]-
asserting his own copyright claims, but only to force all downstream users who wanted to rely
on his contributions to make their own contributions available to everyone else-came to be
known as 'copyleft,' an ironic twist on copyright"); WEBER, supra note 9, at 85;
Gomulkiewicz, supra note 76, at 83-84; Moglen, supra note 94, at 6. As others have noted, the
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users because licensors who select that license are indifferent as to whether
commons-defeating behaviors permitted under current copyright law
occur. 10o
There is, in short, an inverse relationship between allowing the exercise
of proprietary control over software works and the growth of a freely reus-
able commons of such works. The GPL, LGPL, and BSD licenses mark
several of the possible points along a continuum at which the tradeoff be-
tween those two objectives might be effectuated. If FOSS licenses are sub-
ject to the Copyright Act's termination provisions, however, all of those
tradeoffs become conditional, contingent, and uncertain. By strengthening
the commons-defeating features of copyright's statutory defaults, the Copy-
right Act's termination provisions may pose particular risks to the growth of
a software commons.
C. Open-Content Licensing: Non-Software Works
Nothing in the logic of FOSS licensing necessarily confines the crea-
tion of an open-content commons to the realm of software, and a number of
projects have sought to extend the creative dynamism of the FOSS move-
ment to other productive domains. An overview of some of the commonly
used open-content licenses for non-software works reveals both similarities
and differences with the software-licensing regime previously discussed. On
the one hand, other varieties of open-content licenses must grapple with
some of the same tradeoffs that have contributed to the proliferation of
FOSS licenses. Issues surrounding attribution, commercial reuse, and reci-
procity loom equally large outside the software domain, and diverse licen-
sors might see the issues differently depending upon their attitudes toward
the importance of a growing commons. On the other hand, open-content
licensing arrangements have become more sophisticated since the earliest
versions of the GPL and, as discussed below, one family of model licenses
(the Creative Commons licenses) now offers licensors the easy ability to
convert their particular policy preferences into specific license terms with
almost arbitrary granularity.
construction of a commons sometimes fits awkwardly within the proprietary default regime of
copyright law. See, e.g., Vetter, supra note 85, at 2108 ("While the core ideas of free software
are relatively straightforward, the use of intellectual property law to implement those 'free-
doms' is circuitous"). It is precisely for that reason that some have proposed amending the
copyright statute to provide firmer legal footing for open-content works. See Merges, supra
note 41, at 201-02; Adrienne K. Goss, Note, Codifying a Commons: Copyright, Copyleft, and
the Creative Commons Project, 82 CHi.-KENT. L. REv. 963, 992-94 (2007); see also infra Part
V.
Io See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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1. The GFDL
The GNU Project made one of the earliest attempts to apply the com-
mons-enhancing principles of the GPL outside the context of computer
software. The result was the GNU Free Documentation License ("GFDL"),
which was promulgated in 2000.101 An amended GFDL followed in 2002,
which added several new definitional provisions to the license and made a
few changes to the language of the license conditions. 02 In 2008, the GFDL
was again revised, 03 primarily to expand the license's termination (or forfei-
ture) provision' °4 and to add new language permitting the relicensing of
GFDL-licensed works.10 5
The GFDL was written with software documentation in mind, although
by its terms the GFDL may be used for any text. °6 The GFDL, like the GPL,
grants users the rights to engage in acts that would infringe the author's cop-
yright absent a license, including the rights to copy, 107 modify, 08 and redis-
tribute the licensed work.""9 Unlike the GPL, the GFDL expressly permits
copying for commercial purposes."10 Like the GPL and other open-content
licenses, however, the GFDL attaches conditions to the rights granted.
First, the GFDL is a reciprocal (or "copyleft") license. Any modified
version of a GFDL-licensed work that is distributed to others must itself be
11 FSF, GNU FREE DOCUMENTATION LICENSE, VERSION 1.1 (2000), available at http://
www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/fdl- 1.1.html [hereinafter GFDLvl.1]. Although the label
"Version 1.1" might imply the existence of an antecedent "Version 1.0," in fact Version 1.1
was the first version of the GFDL released to the public. Id.
'12 See FSF, GNU FREE DOCUMENTATION LICENSE, VERSION 1.2 (2002), available at http:/
/www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/fdl-1 .2.html [hereinafter GFDLvl.2]; see also, e.g., An-
drrs Guadamuz Gonzdlez, Open Science: Open Source Licenses in Scientific Research, 7 N.C.
J.L. & TECH. 321, 343-44 (2006) (discussing several provisions of the GFDLvl.2).
'03 See FSF, GNU FREE DOCUMENTATION LICENSE, VERSION 1.3 (2008), available at http:/
/www.gnu.org/licenses/fdl.html [hereinafter GFDLvl.3]. This revision of the GFDL was
commonly referred to as "GFDL Version 2" or "GFDL 2.0" during discussions leading up to
the revision, and such references to the license of that type are still available online. See, e.g.,
FSF, FDLv2: FIRST DISCUSSION DRAFT (2006), available at http://gplv3.fsf.org/fdl-draft-2006-
09-22.html. According to the FSF, work is continuing on a future revision of the GFDL, still
slated to be called "Version 2.0." See FSF, FDL 1.3 FAQ, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/fdl-1.3-
faq.html (last visited May 4, 2008) [hereinafter GFDL 1.3 FAQ].
"o See GFDLv1.3, supra note 103, § 9; see also infra notes 119-22 and accompanying
text.
105 See GFDLvl.3, supra note 103, § 11; see also infra notes 141-47 and accompanying
text.
,' See GFDLv1.3, supra note 103, § 0 ("We have designed this License in order to use it
for manuals for free software ... [b]ut this License is not limited to software manuals; it can
be used for any textual work .... We recommend this License principally for works whose
purpose is instruction or reference."). The principles underlying the GFDL are expounded in
RICHARD M. STALLMAN, Free Software Needs Free Documentation, in FREE SOFTWARE, FREE
SOCIErY, supra note 47, at 67.
" GFDLvl.3, supra note 103, §§ 2-3.
18 Id. § 4.
I Id. §§ 2-3.
" ld. § 2.
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released under the GFDL."' In addition, the GFDL mandates attribution" 2
and the inclusion of an express copyright notice," 3 requires modified works
to adopt a new title," 4 forbids certain other modifications of the licensed
content, "' and empowers authors also to forbid modifications of designated
sections of the work, thus requiring the specified portions of the work to be
reproduced verbatim in any subsequent version." 6 Finally, like many other
open-content licenses, the GFDL includes provisions that essentially require
users to be informed about their rights. Any derivatives of GFDL-licensed
content must include an express public notice alerting users to their GFDL-
based permissions to reuse the work"7 and a copy of the GFDL." 8
Like the GPL, the GFDL includes what the license labels a "termina-
tion" clause, providing in essence that a licensee who breaches the condi-
tions of the license may no longer exercise the rights granted.' 9 Absent
default by the licensee, the GFDL expressly provides a license "unlimited in
duration[.]" 120 The GFDL does not declare itself to be "irrevocable," as the
GPL does.' 2 1 Nevertheless, the way the GFDL is used in practice may con-
vey the impression that the license cannot be terminated. 2 2
I"1 Id. §4.
112 1d. § 4(B).
113 Id. § 4(E).
114 Id. § 4(A).
115 Id. § 4(D) (forbidding modification of prior versions' copyright notices), (G) (requiring
verbatim reproduction of lists of invariant sections and required cover texts), (I)-(K) (requiring
preservation of other identified sections as they appeared in prior versions of the work), (0)
(requiring preservation of any disclaimers of warranty that appeared in prior versions of the
work).
116 Id. §§ 1 (defining "Invariant Sections"), 4(L) (requiring that modified versions of the
work "[p]reserve all the Invariant Sections of the Document, unaltered in their text and in
their titles."). These provisions limit the scope of derivative works that may be produced from
GFDL-licensed content by specifying that certain portions of the original work must be repro-
duced without modification in any derivative works. For an explanation of the limited reach
this provision was intended to have, see STALLMAN, supra note 47, at 68; see also GFDLvl.3,
supra note 103, § 1 (explaining, in definition of "Secondary Section," that the portions of
documents authors are allowed to designate as "invariant" must "contain[ ] nothing that
could fall directly within th[e] overall subject" matter addressed by the document's text).
"7 GFDLvl.3, supra note 103, § 4(F).
118 Id. § 4(H). For a suggestion that this requirement may inhibit widespread adoption of
the GFDL, see Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering
in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 413 (2005).
"9 GFDLv1.3, supra note 103, § 9 ("You may not copy, modify, sublicense, or distribute
the Document except as expressly provided under this License. Any attempt otherwise to copy,
modify, sublicense, or distribute it is void, and will automatically terminate your rights under
this License."). The 2008 revisions of the GFDL added new language to the "termination"
provision, adapted from language introduced in the GPLv3, permitting users of GFDL-li-
censed content to cure their default via specified means and reinstate the ights granted under
the license. Compare id., with GFDLv1.2, supra note 102, § 9. See also supra notes 72-73 and
accompanying text.
120 GFDLvl.3, supra note 103, § 1.
12 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
122 See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
20101
Harvard Journal on Legislation
2. Creative Commons licenses
Although the GFDL extended open-content licensing principles outside
the domain of software, the license remains tied to a specific context,
namely, the licensing of software manuals and other texts. Many provisions
of the GFDL, such as the references to "title pages," "cover texts," "invari-
ant sections,"' 23 are difficult to understand or to apply outside the context of
literary works. 24 Thus, although the GFDL represented an important step in
the evolution of open-content licensing, it failed to yield a product generally
applicable to all varieties of copyrightable work.
Extending open-content licensing more broadly to other types of works
became the mission of the nonprofit Creative Commons organization.'25 Cre-
ative Commons's co-founder, law professor Lawrence Lessig, explained that
the project aimed to create a commons of expressive works freely available
for others to copy and reuse by adopting the same types of licensing arrange-
ments that had proved successful in the FOSS world:
The idea (again, stolen from the FSF [Free Software Foundation])
was to produce copyright licenses that artists, authors, educators,
and researchers could use to announce to the world the freedoms
that they want their creative work to carry. If the default rule of
copyright is "all rights reserved," the express meaning of a Crea-
tive Commons license is that only "some rights [are] reserved."
For example, copyright law gives the copyright holder the exclu-
sive right to make "copies" of his or her work. A Creative Com-
mons license could, in effect, announce that this exclusive right
was given to the public. 126
To appreciate the innovative character of the Creative Commons family
of licenses, consider how each of the licenses considered so far joins certain
policy decisions together in the terms of the license. In the case of the FOSS
licenses, policies surrounding attribution, reciprocity, and commercial use
converge, while the GFDL raises the possible prohibition on certain forms of
derivative works. Each of the licenses considered previously joins policy
decisions on several of those issues together in a single license: GPL-li-
censed works may be copied for noncommercial purposes, but only on recip-
rocal terms; BSD-licensed works may be copied for commercial purposes,
but only if the licensee provides attribution; and so forth.
"23 See GFDLvl.3, supra note 103, § 1 (defining these and other related terms).
'- Cf 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining "literary works").
125 See Creative Commons, What is CC?, http://creativecommons.org/about/what-is-cc
(last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
126 Posting of Lawrence Lessig to Commons News, http://creativecommons.org/weblog/
entry/5661 (Oct. 6, 2005); see also Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 55 FLA. L. Rev.
763 (2003) (sketching out philosophy behind the project).
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The genius of the Creative Commons project lay in disaggregating all
the policy decisions implicit in the pre-existing family of open-content li-
censes and permitting licensors to recombine them individually in whatever
fashion best suited their intent. 27 Creative Commons licenses present au-
thors, in effect, with a menu of license criteria, each reflecting a particular
policy decision, from which the author is free to pick and choose. The vari-
ous possible license criteria (and the recognized Creative Commons abbrevi-
ations) are:
" Attribution ("BY"): should users be required to give credit to the
original author and/or publisher when they copy or reuse the licensed
work?
* Noncommercial ("NC"): are users free to copy or reuse the licensed
work for commercial purposes, or for noncommercial purposes only?
" No Derivatives ("ND"): are users free to create derivative works
based on the licensed work, or may they reproduce only verbatim
copies of the original?
" Share Alike ("SA "): are users free to adopt more restrictive licensing
terms for any derivative works they create, or must they adopt the
same license chosen by the original author?128
All the publicly available Creative Commons licenses presently include the
attribution requirement, 29 leaving authors free to select "yes" or "no" as to
each of the remaining three options. Although there are eight possible ways
127 To be sure, its innovations in licensing instruments may not be the most important
contribution of the Creative Commons project; much like the broader FOSS movement, Crea-
tive Commons is as much a social initiative aimed at shifting public norms surrounding the
reuse of expressive content as a purely legal organization. See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 11,
at 455-56; Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93
VA. L. Rav. 1899, 1930 (2007) ("Ultimately, the Creative Commons is more of a social move-
ment than an alternative IP regime."). For a slightly skeptical view of the Creative Commons
project from a strong property-rights perspective, however, see Merges, supra note 41, at
196-200.
128 See Creative Commons, License Your Work, http://creativecommons.org/about/license/
(last visited Apr. 2, 2010) [hereinafter License Your Work].
129 See Johnson, supra note 70, at 412-13 (explaining requisites of required attribution).
The Creative Commons organization initially promulgated a set of licenses that omitted the
attribution requirement, and indeed, those licenses remain available (albeit difficult to locate)
on the organization's web site. See Creative Commons, Retired Licenses, http://creativecom-
mons.org/retiredlicenses (last visited Mar. 29, 2010). The organization ceased offering (or up-
dating) the non-attribution varieties upon discovering that virtually all licensors were selecting
the Attribution variants. See Fisk, supra note 85, at 91 (noting that it remains possible to
disclaim the default attribution requirement); Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright
and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. REv. 41, 79-81 (2007) (describing Creative Commons
organization's decision to withdraw non-attribution license variants); accord Abraham Bell &
Gideon Pachomovsky, The Evolution of Private and Open Access Property, 10 Tmo"TiacAL
INQUIRiES L. 77, 97 (2009) (noting that Creative Commons licenses preserve some incidents of
private property ownership insofar as "most content owners insist on receiving attribution
from users"); Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92
CAL. L. REv. 1331, 1361 (2004) (offering empirical support for this proposition); Zachary
Katz, Pitfalls of Open Licensing: An Analysis of Creative Commons Licensing, 46 IDEA 391,
411 & app. A (2006) (same).
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to answer a set of three yes-or-no questions, two combinations are off the
table because an author cannot choose both "No Derivatives" (derivative
works are forbidden) and "Share Alike" (derivative works are permitted so
long as they are distributed under the same license terms). The remaining six
possible combinations, accordingly, describe the basic family of Creative
Commons licenses from which creators may choose: (1) Attribution only
(BY); (2) Attribution-Share Alike (BY-SA); (3) Attribution-No Derivatives
(BY-ND); (4) Attribution-Non-Commercial (BY-NC); (5) Attribution-Non-
Commercial-Share Alike (BY-NC-SA); and (6) Attribution-Non-Commer-
cial-No Derivatives (BY-NC-ND). 130 Web sites, photographs, instructional
materials, scholarly research, comic strips, maps, sound recordings, motion
pictures, and many other works-numbering in the hundreds of millions 131-
have been published under Creative Commons licenses.
All six of the standard Creative Commons licenses permit users to copy
and distribute the licensed works, although the three "NC" licenses disallow
copying and distribution for commercial purposes. 13 2 Four of the licenses (all
except the two "ND" variants) also permit users to create and distribute
modified works based on the licensed content, although the two "NC" vari-
ants again restrict commercial uses, and the two "SA" variants require re-
transmission of the same set of licensed freedoms to users of any such
derivative works. The combined effect of all these alternatives is to give the
licensor fine-grained control over the various policy decisions implicated in
the other open-content licensing arrangements discussed above. Whether to
allow derivative works, whether to require licensing reciprocity, whether to
13 See License Your Work, supra note 128. The listing in the text arrays the licenses
roughly in increasing order of restrictiveness. See, e.g., Goss, supra note 99, at 978; Maritza
Schaeffer, Note, Contemporary Issues in the Visual Art Realm: How Useful are Creative Com-
mons Licenses?, 17 J.L. & POL'Y 359, 385-87 (2008). Like the GNU GPL and the other
licenses considered previously, the text of the Creative Commons licenses has been amended
from time to time, with each amended version being assigned a revision number to differenti-
ate it from its predecessors. When referring to works published under a Creative Commons
license, it is customary to note the applicable version number of the license. See, e.g., Peter W.
Martin, Reconfiguring Law Reports and the Concept of Precedent for a Digital Age, 53 VILL.
L. REv. 1, 1 n.* (2008) ("This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-
Noncommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 License."). To add a final layer of complexity, different ver-
sions of each Creative Commons license exist that are tailored to the particularities of different
national legal systems, and where a particular jurisdiction's version of the license applies, it is
common to so note. See, e.g., Timothy K. Armstrong, Fair Circumvention, 74 BROOK. L. REv.
1 (2008) (adopting BY-SA-3.0-US license).
31 See OECD, supra note 45, at 24 ("figures show that there are at least 200 million
pieces of content on the Internet that are under various Creative Commons licenses (as counted
by the number of 'link-backs' to these licenses on the Internet as tracked by Google)").
132 To be more precise, a party wishing to make a commercial use of a work licensed
under one of the Creative Commons "NC" variants must seek dual licensing of the work from
the copyright holder upon terms that allow such use. See Creative Commons, Frequently
Asked Questions - CC Wild, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/FAQ (last visited Apr. 2, 2010)
("You can always approach the licensor directly to see if they will separately license you the
commercial rights."); supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing dual licensing).
(Vol. 47
Shrinking the Commons
allow commercial uses, and even whether to require attribution are each
choices that the licensor may make essentially independently.'33
The Creative Commons license documents are expressed in what the
organization refers to as "legal code."'134 At its most essential level, the "le-
gal code" constitutes the license; it is the formal language expressing the
grants of rights and the limiting conditions selected by the licensor.'35 To
encourage widespread adoption and use of its licenses, however, Creative
Commons also provides so-called "commons deeds": accessible, plain-En-
glish summaries of the rights and limitations of each of the six standard
licenses. 13 6 Finally, the organization offers each license as machine-readable
metadata to aid indexing of the licensed work by search engines. 13 7
The "legal code" of each Creative Commons license includes a "termi-
nation" (or forfeiture) clause of the same kind as the GPL. as Section 7(a) of
the current version of each of the six standard licenses states, in part, that
"jt]his License and the rights granted hereunder will terminate automati-
cally upon any breach by You of the terms of this License," subject to speci-
fied exceptions."' Absent default by the licensee, however, Creative
Commons licenses are expressly declared to be perpetual and, indeed, not
capable of withdrawal by the licensor:
Subject to the above terms and conditions, the license granted here
is perpetual (for the duration of the applicable copyright in the
Work). Notwithstanding the above, Licensor reserves the right to
release the Work under different license terms or to stop distribut-
ing the Work at any time; provided, however that any such elec-
tion will not serve to withdraw this License ... and this License
will continue in full force and effect unless terminated as stated
above.140
'33 See R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to be Free: Intellectual Property and the My-
thologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1032-33 (2003) (arguing that Creative Com-
mons licenses are effective in effectuating licensors' specific intent precisely because they
emerge against a background of strong proprietary rights for the licensor).
134 The influence of law professor Lawrence Lessig, a co-founder of Creative Commons
and the progenitor of the "code is law" meme, is readily apparent in the choice of the label
"legal code." See LESSIG, supra note 49, at 1-8.
' For example, the "legal code" for the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike-3.0-
United States license is available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/uslegalcode
(last visited Mar. 4, 2010) [hereinafter CC BY-SA-3.0-US Legal Code]. See also Srverine
Dusollier, The Master's Tools v. The Master's House: Creative Commons v. Copyright, 29
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 271, 276 (2006) ("The Legal Code is a lengthy contract with numerous
detailed provisions ... that can be legally enforced").
136 See Schaeffer, supra note 130, at 385.
'37 See id.
'38 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
139 CC BY-SA-3.0-US Legal Code, supra note 135, § 7(a). Identical language appears in
the same location in the "legal code" for each of the six standard licenses.
"4 Id. § 7(b); cf supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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Some Creative Commons-licensed projects have adopted additional ex-
planatory language that tends to emphasize the purportedly permanent and
irrevocable character of the rights granted under the license. The massive
online Wikipedia encyclopedia 141 supplies a prominent example. Since
Wikipedia's inception in 2001, user contributions have been licensed under
the GFDL. 142 The same characteristics that make the GFDL problematic for
content other than software manuals, however, meant that the license never
fit perfectly with the rapidly evolving content of Wikipedia. In 2008, in re-
sponse to a request from the Wikimedia Foundation ("WMF"), 43 a new
"relicensing" section was added to the GFDL permitting some GFDL-li-
censed works to be relicensed under the Creative Commons BY-SA 3.0 li-
cense. 144 Following a strongly favorable vote by the WMF user
community, 145 WMF passed a resolution allowing dual licensing of WMF
content (including Wikipedia) under both the GFDL and the Creative Com-
mons BY-SA 3.0 license. 146 Today, visiting any editable Wikipedia page and
clicking the "Edit this Page" button brings up the following warning at the
bottom of the page: "You irrevocably agree to release your contributions
under the Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License 3.0 and the
GFDL."
47
141 Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2010). As of March 2010,
the billion-word corpus of the English-language version of Wikipedia was approximately
twenty-five times the size of the Encyclopedia Britannica, as measured only by estimated
word counts-a statistic that excludes, for example, the rich graphic and tabular material
unique to Wikipedia and its sister Wikimedia Foundation sites. See Wikipedia, Size Compari-
sons, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Size-comparisons (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
14 2 See ANDREW LIH, THE WIKIPEDIA REVOLUTION: How A BUNCH OF NOBODIES CREATED
THE WORLD'S GREATEST ENCYCLOPEDIA 72-73 (2009); see also supra notes 101-22 and ac-
companying text (discussing the GFDL).
"43 WMF, Resolution: License Update, http://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Resolution:
License_update (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
4 See GFDL 1.3 FAQ, supra note 103; GFDLvl.3, supra note 103, § 11; see also LIH,
supra note 142, at 212 (anticipating this development).
"45 See Wikimedia Meta-Wiki, Licensing Update/Result, http://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/
Licensing-update/Result (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) (reflecting over seventy-five percent sup-
port for proposed relicensing and only ten percent opposition, among the over seventeen thou-
sand valid votes). The author participated in the vote (in his role as a contributor to the
English-language Wikisource project, a sister site of Wikipedia) and voted in favor of the
relicensing proposal.
See Press Release, WMF, Wikimedia Foundation Announces Important Licensing
Change for Wikipedia and Its Sister Projects (May 21, 2009), available at http://
wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Press-releases/Duallicense-vote_.May_2009. The joint action
of the FSF and the WMF to enable the relicensing of Wikipedia under a Creative Commons
license tends to suggest that one of the common criticisms of open-content licensing-namely,
that a proliferation of license standards impedes rather than promotes sharing and reuse of the
licensed content-has been overstated. See, e.g., Dusollier, supra note 8, at 1425-27; Elkin-
Koren, supra note 118, at 412-13; Van Houweling, supra note 31, at 942.
' See Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org (last visited Mar. 29, 2010) (emphasis added).
Go ahead, try it. You'll see.
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Contributors to open-content projects act from a (probably irreducible)
diversity of motivations141-from a desire to practice or to pass along the
contributor's unique skills or knowledge, 49 to political opposition to the pre-
dominance of the proprietary production paradigm for informational goods
and the agendas of the large and powerful enterprises that the dominant par-
adigm sustains, 50 to the sense of satisfaction and reputational gains that de-
rive from having one's expertise recognized and appreciated,' 5' to the
enjoyment of solving complex problems 5 1 to simple altruism or the desire to
advance human knowledge.'53 Depending on their motivation, individual
contributors to open-content projects may react differently to the discovery
that the licenses authorizing them to modify and redistribute the content on
which they worked are subject to possible termination. For example, those
disinclined to see proprietization as an evil to be avoided (such as developers
of BSD-licensed software) may be indifferent to the possibility of termina-
tion of the license. On the other hand, contributors motivated more strongly
by a desire to build a commons of works that will remain freely reusable in
perpetuity may view the risk of termination very differently. Those users
may have contributed to the project based partly on the understanding that
the work to which they contributed would remain forever available for
others to copy and modify. Provisions of many existing open-content li-
censes encourage precisely this presumption? 4 Under existing U.S. copy-
right law, however, licensors may be disabled from delivering upon a
promise of a perpetual, irrevocable license.
141 See BENKLER, supra note 11, at 92-99 (noting that economic models of behavior uni-
formly tend to oversimplify complexities underlying human action); WEBER, supra note 9, ch.
5 (attempting to disentangle collective from individual motivations); Andrew George, Note,
Avoiding Tragedy in the Wiki-Commons, 12 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, IT 9-34 (2007) (focusing
particularly on various motivations of contributors to Wikipedia); Karim R. Lakhani & Robert
G. Wolf, Why Hackers Do What They Do: Understanding Motivation and Effort in Free/Open
Source Software Projects, in PERSPECTIVES ON FREE AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 3 (Joseph
Feller et al., eds., 2005); Katherine J. Strandburg, Evolving Innovation Paradigms and the
Global Intellectual Property Regime, 41 CONN. L. REV. 861, 871 & n.37 (2009) (noting rela-
tively weak role of traditional economic incentives in peer production).
149 See WEBER, supra note 9, at 134-35; George, supra note 148, 12-15.
1SO See WEBER, supra note 9, at 139-40; George, supra note 148, 11 19-20.
15' BENKLER, supra note 11, at 94 ("there will be some acts that a person would prefer to
perform not for money, but for social standing, recognition, and . . . instrumental value");
RAYMOND, supra note 47, at 97-100, 102-03 (describing FOSS development as a "gift cul-
ture" in which contributors compete, in part, to improve their own reputations as skilled cod-
ers); WEBER, supra note 9, at 141-43; Fisk, supra note 85, at 88-92 (emphasizing how
reputational motivations are fostered by mandatory attribution policies); George, supra note
148, 1[ 30-34.
152 See RAYMOND, supra note 47, at 100-02.
... Jyh-An Lee, New Perspectives on Public Goods Production: Policy Implications of
Open Source Software, 9 VAND. J. Err. & TECH. L. 45, 53-55 (2006); George, supra note 148,
16-18. But see WEBER, supra note 9, at 131 (identifying several aspects of peer production
that tend to weigh against altruism as a primary motivating factor).
" See supra notes 72-74, 120, 140 and accompanying text.
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III. COPYRIGHT LICENSING AND TERMINATION
Between 1976 and 1998, Congress acted repeatedly to limit the entry of
copyrighted works into the public domain. What makes this trend remarka-
ble is that in the course of amending the Copyright Act, Congress, in the
name of protecting authors, arguably took from them a power they had
clearly enjoyed under pre-1976 law: namely, the power voluntarily to relin-
quish rights in their works for the benefit of the public. At the same time,
Congress added new statutory provisions empowering authors to recapture
rights in their works that had formerly been licensed or conveyed away. The
effect has been to make it ever more difficult for authors permanently to part
with their exclusive copyright rights, even where they may knowingly and
voluntarily wish to do so.
A. From Opt-In to Opt-Out to Locked-In
1. The Evolution of Copyright Standards
The protection of expressive works under copyright has proceeded
through three distinct phases. From 1790 to 1977, U.S. law defined an "opt-
in" copyright system. Works enjoyed federal 5 copyright protection if, but
only if, authors performed all the necessary actions-today commonly la-
beled "formalities"-that were necessary upon publication of the work for
protection to attach.' 56 The principal requisites to secure copyright protection
included: (1) providing notice of copyright in proper form; (2) registration of
copyright in the work; and (3) depositing of a copy of the work with the
Library of Congress.'57 Authors who published their works without strictly
observing the applicable formalities forfeited copyright protection; 15 8 indeed,
' Although copyright is now a domain of exclusive federal jurisdiction, see 17 U.S.C.
§ 301 (2006), parallel systems of federal and state copyright protection existed until the Copy-
right Act of 1976. A discussion of state copyright systems is outside the scope of the present
work.
116 See NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 54-55 (2008) (observing that
early formal requirements imposed "nontrivial" burdens).
'See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 9 (notice), 10 (registration), 12 (deposit), 35
Stat. 1075. This listing admittedly simplifies the complex history of formal requirements for
copyright protection in the United States. For the unsimplified version, see 3 WILLIAM F. PA-
TRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 6:3 (2009). By referring to the formalities necessary for copy-
right protection to attach, this Article purposefully elides the formalities that continue to exist
under U.S. law for other purposes, such as the requirement to register before bringing suit for
copyright infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.
Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010) (construing pre-filing registration requirement as
nonjurisdictional).
.. See, e.g., Mifflin v. R.H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260 (1903) (failure of notice require-
ment); Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899) (failure of deposit requirement); Thompson v.
Hubbard, 131 U.S. 123, 148-51 (1889) (notice in improper form); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S.
(8 Pet.) 591, 665-68 (1834) (failure of deposit and publication of notice requirements); Atd.
Monthly Co. v. Post Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 556, 559 (D. Mass. 1928) (failure of notice require-
ment). But cf Washingtonian Pub. Co., Inc. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 37-40 (1939) (holding
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courts often referred to the author's failure to comply with formalities as a
"dedication" of the work to the public domain. 5 9
This strict "opt-in" regime ended on January 1, 1978, the effective date
of the Copyright Act of 1976.160 The Act converted copyright to an "opt-
out" regime: federal copyright protection attached automatically, by opera-
tion of law, without any further action by the author, the moment a work was
"fixed in a tangible medium of expression."'' 6 The 1976 Act preserved some
existing formalities; copyrighted works were still required to bear a notice of
copyright in a form specified by statute 62 and to be deposited with the Li-
brary of Congress. 163 In what Congress recognized as "a major change in the
theoretical framework of American copyright law," 164 however, noncompli-
ance with formalities was no longer necessarily fatal to copyright protection.
The deposit requirement was expressly declared not to be a condition of
copyrightability, 65 and Congress provided a mechanism permitting authors
to cure noncompliance with the notice requirement. 166 The mechanism for
curing defaults rested upon Congress's perception of a need to protect au-
thors from inadvertent or accidental losses of their rights, 67 although authors
who failed to avail themselves of the cure provision still risked having their
work enter the public domain. 68
that, under Copyright Act of 1909, failure to comply with deposit requirement did not invali-
date copyright).
"' See, e.g., Pub. Affairs Assocs. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1962) (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting); Donald Frederick Evans & Assocs. v. Cont'l Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d 897, 912 (11 th
Cir. 1986); Cooling Syst. & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir.
1985); Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, 628 F.2d 1038, 1042 (7th Cir. 1980); Deward &
Rich v. Bristol Sav. & Loan Corp., 120 F.2d 537, 540 (4th Cir. 1941); cf. Goodis v. United
Artists Television, Inc., 278 F. Supp. 122, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, 425 F.2d 397 (2d Cir.
1970).
"ro Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102, 90 Stat. 2541, 2598 (1976) (codified at note preceding 17
U.S.C. § 101).
161 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659 (explaining that fixation of work in a tangible medium "represents the
dividing line between common law and statutory protection"); id. at 130 ("the statute would
apply to all works created after its effective date, whether or not they are ever published or
disseminated").
162 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-404 (1988).
163 See id. § 407.
"6 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 146.
.65 See 17 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2008).
'6See id. § 405; see also, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 443-44
(4th Cir. 1986) (finding that plaintiff took adequate steps to cure deficiencies in copyright
notice).
'67 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 143 (justifying cure provisions as necessary to prevent "ar-
bitrary and unjust forfeitures ... resulting from unintentional or relatively unimportant omis-
sions or errors in the copyright notice").
168 See, e.g., Harris Custom Builders, Inc. v. Hoffmeyer, 92 F.3d 517, 520 (7th Cir. 1996);
Princess Fabrics, Inc. v. CHF, Inc., 922 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1990); Canfield v.
Ponchatoula Times, 759 F.2d 493, 499 (5th Cir. 1985). Thus, authors who affirmatively desired
to opt out of the federal system of copyright protection, and place their works in the public
domain, could do so by purposefully failing to cure deficient formalities.
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The policy of protecting authors from their own mistakes reached the
point of reductio ad absurdum on March 1, 1989, the effective date of the
Berne Convention Implementation Act ("BCIA"). 6 9 In the name of bringing
the United States into compliance with the Berne Convention's "no formali-
ties" mandate, 70 Congress made compliance with formalities not only
nonessential, but irrelevant. The language of the key statutory provision on
notice of copyright was changed from the mandatory "shall" to the permis-
sive "may, 17 1 and the provision allowing authors to cure defective formali-
ties was amended to have purely retrospective application. 72 Thus, although
defects in formalities for works published before March 1, 1989 can still
result in forfeiture of copyright if not cured,7 3 later-published works are at
no risk of forfeiting copyright protection due to noncompliance with statu-
tory formalities. 74 The conditional protections given to authors under the
Copyright Act of 1976 against unintentional, inadvertent losses of their
rights had become absolute. 175
As a result, there is a colorable argument that copyright legislation in
the United States has gradually converted copyright from a selectable privi-
lege to an indefeasible entitlement. 76 That argument, and the presumption of
strong rights for authors upon which it rests, may influence courts' willing-
ness to entertain arguments that an open-content licensor should be dis-
empowered to terminate her grant of rights under a license and recapture
ownership of copyright in the work. ' 77 To complete the picture, however, it
69 Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 13(a), 102 Stat. 2853, 2861 (1988) (codified at note following
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)).
"70/d. § 2(3), 102 Stat. at 2853 (declaring that "[t]he amendments made by this Act,
together with [existing law] ... satisfy the obligations of the United States in adhering to the
Berne Convention and no further rights or interests shall be recognized or created for that
purpose."); Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, § 5(2), opened for
signature Sept. 9, 1886, 6 U.S.T. 2731 ("[t]he enjoyment and exercise of [copyright] rights
shall not be subject to any formality").
"' Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7(a)(2), 102 Stat. at 2857 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 401(a)); id.
§ 7(b)(2), 102 Stat. at 2858 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 402(a)).
72 Id. § 7(e)(1), 102 Stat. at 2858 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)).
173 See Norma Ribbon & Trimming, Inc. v. Little, 51 F.3d 45, 48 (5th Cir. 1995).
174 See Morgan v. Hawthorne Homes, Inc., 2009 WL 1010476, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 14,
2009) ("Each of the eight plans at issue were published after March of 1989, and therefore any
omission of notice does not result in forfeiture and provides no basis for finding that Plaintiff
does not have a valid copyright in the eight plans."); Sadhu Singh Hamdad Trust v. Ajit News-
paper Adver., Mktg., & Commc'ns, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 2d 577, 587 n.15 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
("works first published after March 1, 1989 need not bear a notice of copyright to attain
copyright protection"); Innovative Networks, Inc. v. Satellite Airlines Ticketing Ctrs., Inc.,
871 F. Supp. 709, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("affixing notice is no longer mandatory for works
first published after March 1, 1989").
'1 See Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the
Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 743-44 (2001) ("Each new version of
the Copyright Act has awarded longer, broader, and more powerful legal protection to expres-
sive works." (footnotes omitted)).
176 See id. at 742 ("Copyright law, originally excused as a necessary evil, now threatens to
become an inescapable burden." (footnotes omitted)).
... See infra Part IV.A.
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may be useful to examine two related limitations on the strong-property-
rights vision of the legislative enactments to date: first, the judge-made prin-
ciple that creators may affirmatively renounce their own rights under copy-
right, and second, the introduction of licensing instruments that aim to
effectuate such partial or total abandonments of copyright interests by
authors.
2. Abandonment of Copyright
Before the Copyright Act of 1976, an author could effectively abandon
copyright protection for a work and place it in the public domain by publish-
ing without a valid copyright notice or by failing to renew the copyright after
the expiration of the initial twenty-eight-year term of protection."1 The 1976
Act substantially weakened the former alternative (by allowing authors to
cure defective notices) and eliminated the latter alternative altogether (by
creating a unitary copyright term lacking any renewal requirement). 79 The
BCIA, in turn, eliminated mandatory notice entirely. 80 As a result, U.S. cop-
yright law now supplies no clear statutory path for placing a work in the
public domain during the author's lifetime. Under the present statute, copy-
right rights attach automatically the moment a work is fixed in a tangible
medium, and nothing in the statute provides for the possible loss of those
rights during the lifetime of the author or for seventy years thereafter. This is
in marked contrast to the Patent Act, which provides a number of avenues
whereby inventions may enter the public domain. 8'
At first glance, the doctrine of copyright abandonment seems to fill the
gap. The courts have, for more than a century, stated that copyright owners
'7 Under the Copyright Act of 1909, the initial term of protection for a validly acquired
copyright was twenty-eight years, following which a renewal application for a second term
(also of twenty-eight years) could be filed. See Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat.
1075, 1080 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976)). Failure to renew the copyright at the end of the
initial twenty-eight-year term of protection placed the work in the public domain. See id. ("in
default of ... application for renewal and extension, the copyright in any work shall determine
at the expiration of twenty-eight years from first publication"); see also G. Ricordi & Co. v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir. 1951); Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp.
2d 340, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc.,
923 F. Supp. 1231, 1241 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Int'l Film Exch., Ltd. v. Corinth Films, Inc., 621 F.
Supp. 631, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Vestiges of the two-term copyright framework that existed
under the 1909 Act and earlier federal copyright statutes survive today in 17 U.S.C. § 304
(2006).
'17 The 1976 Act created a single fixed copyright term for all works fixed in a tangible
medium of expression on or after January 1, 1978, consisting of the life of the author plus fifty
years. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976) (amended 1998). The life-plus-fifty copyright term was
extended to life-plus-seventy in 1998, when Congress extended by twenty years the duration of
all copyrights then in force. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186
(2003).
180 See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
IS' See infra notes 331-36 and accompanying text.
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may disclaim copyright and dedicate their works to the public domain.'82
The case law on copyright abandonment, however, is muddled, because
courts often use words like "abandonment" or "dedication to the public do-
main" to describe mere noncompliance with statutory formalities.'83 In a
world where formalities have been eliminated as a precondition of statutory
copyright protection, the continuing relevance of such "abandonment" cases
is unclear.
Judge Learned Hand's opinion in National Comics Publications v.
Fawcett Publications'1 4 is often cited for the general proposition that authors
may abandon their copyrights. The court stated-unfortunately, without cit-
ing authority-that:
We do not doubt that the "author or proprietor of any work made
the subject of copyright" by the Copyright Law may "abandon"
his literary property in the "work" before he has published it, or
his copyright in it after he has done so; but he must "abandon" it
by some overt act which manifests his purpose to surrender his
rights in the "work," and to allow the public to copy it."s5
... See generally STEPHFN FISHMAN, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 6-1 to 6-20
(2008).
..3 See supra note 159; see also, e.g., Sanga Music, Inc. v. EMI Blackwood Music, Inc.,
55 F.3d 756, 759-62 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that a songwriter's "words and actions," such as
her approval of the publication of her song without formalities, suggested that she intended to
dedicate the work to the public domain); Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768
F.2d 1001, 1019 (9th Cir. 1985) (describing publication without formalities as involving both
"forfeiture" and "abandonment" of copyright); Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d
895, 898 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that district court erred in finding abandonment where neces-
sary statutory formalities were observed); Stuff v. E.C. Publ'ns, Inc., 342 F.2d 143, 145 (2d
Cir. 1965) (cartoonist's acquiescence in publication of cartoon without formalities amounted to
"dedicat[ion] to the public"); Egner v. E.C. Shirmer Music Co., 139 F.2d 398, 399 (1st Cir.
1943) (licensees published work by permission of author without formalities); Nutt v. Nat'l
Inst. Inc. for the Improvement of Memory, 31 F.2d 236, 238 (2d Cir. 1929) (oral delivery of
lecture before filing of application for copyright did not constitute "publication" of the work
without formalities); Werckmeister v. Am. Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321, 326-30 (2d Cir.
1904) (reasoning that public display of painting without notice of copyright did not constitute
"publication" of the work without formalities so as to void copyright protection); Falk v. Gast
Lithograph & Engraving Co., 54 F. 890, 893 (2d Cir. 1893) (circulation of title cards upon
which reduced-size versions of copyrighted photographs were reproduced did not divest copy-
right in the underlying photographs where title cards omitted any copyright notice); Lopez v.
Elec. Rebuilders, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1133, 1135 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (consent to publication with-
out copyright notice); Jacobs v. Robitaille, 406 F. Supp. 1145, 1149 (D.N.H. 1976); Foreign
Car Parts, Inc. v. Auto World, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 977, 979-80 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Rosette v.
Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183, 1188-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (although publishing
musical composition in the form of sheet music without observing formalities would have
divested copyright, recording of the composition did not do so), aft'd, 546 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.
1976); DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Fla. 1962) (publication of
architectural plans without observing copyright formalities); McCarthy & Fischer, Inc. v.
White, 259 F. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1919); Higgins v. Keuffel, 30 F. 627, 628 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887).
's4 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951).
I d. at 598 (footnote omitted). Prior Supreme Court decisions on abandonment of patent
rights might have supplied appropriate referents for the court. See infra note 331 and accompa-
nying text. Judge Hand's failure to recognize these analytically related authorities, however,
may simply reflect the era in which the case arose. It would be some years before the Supreme
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Although Judge Hand's statement was dictum,8 6 later courts have ac-
cepted and applied the Fawcett Publications test for copyright abandon-
ment-an "overt act" that demonstrates the author's intent "to surrender his
rights." In most of the cases, however, the references to the Fawcett Publi-
cations dictum (or similar restatements of the test for abandonment) are
themselves dicta, as the courts virtually always conclude that there has been
no abandonment, finding insufficient proof of intent,8 7 proof of the required
overt act,' or both.8 9
There are exceedingly few cases squarely presenting a scenario of cop-
yright abandonment. In Bell v. Combined Registry Co.,19 a district court
determined that a poet, intending to make "a 'gift' to the world,"' 91 had
abandoned copyright in his poem; but the court of appeals found it unneces-
sary to reach the abandonment issue because the poet had failed to comply
with statutory formalities. 192 In Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan,'93 a dis-
Court approved the practice of borrowing patent principles when construing the copyright
statutes. See infra notes 337-45 and accompanying text.
86 See Fawcet Publ'ns, 191 F.2d at 598 ("[t]here was no evidence in this case of any
such an intent" to abandon copyright rights).
187 See, e.g., Dam Things from Den. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.
2002); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001); Kepner-
Tregoe, Inc. v. Vroom, 186 F.3d 283, 288 (2d Cir. 1999); Dodd, Mead & Co. v. Lilienthal, 514
F. Supp. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop.
Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 362 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown
Publishers, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 531, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); L&L White Metal Casting Corp. v.
Cornell Metal Specialties Corp., 353 F. Supp. 1170, 1174 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Nat'l Council of
Young Israel, Inc. v. Feit Co., 347 F. Supp. 1293, 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Marvin Worth Prods.
v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Grove Press, Inc. v.
Greenleaf Pub. Co., 247 F. Supp. 518, 527-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); cf. Capitol Records, Inc. v.
Naxos of Am., Inc., 372 F.3d 471, 483-84 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that conflicting evidence of
intent to abandon precluded summary disposition); Schatt v. Curtis Mgmt. Group, 764 F.
Supp. 902, 907-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same); Rexnord Inc. v. Modem Handling Sys., Inc., 379
F. Supp. 1190, 1199 (D. Del. 1974) (same).
"'8 See, e.g., Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 1998) (although
overt act representing partial abandonment may have occurred, "abandoning some rights is not
the same as abandoning all rights, and FormGen never overtly abandoned its rights to profit
commercially"); Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960);
John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24 (D. Mass.
2002); Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1180 (W.D.N.Y.
1982); Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 426 F. Supp. 690, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (failure
to renew copyright in derivative motion pictures did not constitute an overt act abandoning
copyright in the underlying novels on which the motion pictures were based); Rohauer v.
Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723, 730-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'don other grounds, 551
F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977); Judscott Handprints, Ltd. v. Washington Wall Paper Co., 377 F. Supp.
1372, 1378 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Nationwide Indep. Directory Serv., Inc., 371
F. Supp. 900, 906 (W.D. Ark. 1974).
189 See, e.g., Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ'g. Group, I 1 F. Supp. 2d 329, 337
(S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'dmem., 181 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1999); Jackson v. MPI Home Video, 694 F.
Supp. 483, 490-91 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
190 397 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. 11. 1975), aftd, 536 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1976).
191 397 F. Supp. at 1249.
'92 536 F.2d at 170.
193 572 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ga. 1983), affid in part, rev'd in part, 744 F.2d 1490 (1 1th
Cir. 1984).
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trict court determined, with little analysis, that a television station had taken
an overt act manifesting its intent to abandon copyright in its news broad-
casts when it regularly destroyed its own copies of the broadcasts a week
after they had aired. 94 An appellate court declared it "questionable whether
[the station] had such an intent,"'95 but ultimately deferred to the trial
court's finding. 196 The appellate court's decision in Duncan adds little to an
understanding of copyright abandonment, however, in light of its focus on
the remedies ordered by the trial court and on the First Amendment issues
implicated in the case. 197 In Rouse v. Walter & Associates,9" authors of
software repeatedly referred to their employer as the holder of copyright.
The court suggested that the plaintiffs' repeated disclaimers of their own
copyright interests were tantamount to an abandonment of copyright.' 99 The
court's statements regarding the question of abandonment, however, were
mere dicta, for it had already concluded that the plaintiffs' employer was the
true owner of the program under the work made for hire doctrine.t °°
After excluding the cases where "abandonment" represents a mere
proxy for noncompliance with formalities or where the concept is invoked
merely to add weight to decisions resting on other grounds, there remains a
very small number of reported decisions in which the question of copyright
abandonment was both squarely raised and case-dispositive. In Hadady
Corp. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,20 a copyright holder published a work
with a notice that expressly limited the term of copyright in the work to two
days.202 A district court held that the notice was tantamount to an abandon-
ment of copyright in the work at the expiration of the two-day period. 203 In
Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures,2° 4 an architect signed a letter indicat-
ing that he "reserved no patent, trademark, copyright, trade secret or other
intellectual property rights" in an architectural design .205 Although the archi-
tect later sought to clarify that he believed the letter waived copyright pro-
tection only as against its recipient,2°6 a district court held that the letter
"clearly and unambiguously manifested his intent to abandon any copyright
protection" over the accompanying work. 07
"9 572 F. Supp. at 1196.
19' 744 F.2d at 1500.
196 See id.
"9 See id. at 1498-1500.
... 513 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Iowa 2007).
199 See id. at 1069-70.
200See id. at 1055-65; see also 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006).
201 739 F. Supp. 1392 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
0 See id. at 1396 (" 'The information contained in this letter is protected by U.S. copy-
right laws though noon EST on the 2d day after its release[.]"').
203 See id. at 1399.
204 469 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
205 Id. at 1154.
' See id.
'7id. at 1178.
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Courts that have considered the abandonment question have generally
concluded that abandonment is an all-or-nothing proposition; an abandon-
ment is effective only if the author renounces all rights in the work.208 This
rule may limit courts' receptivity to arguments that an author has abandoned
her rights, because the consequence of accepting the argument is that the
author loses all rights to prevent any copying or other use of the work.209
Judicial reluctance to impose such severe consequences, absent the most un-
equivocal indication that such was the author's intent, may do much to ex-
plain the comparative scarcity of cases finding abandonment of copyright. 210
For whatever reason, however, it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion
that the doctrine of copyright abandonment is presently something of a paper
tiger.21' Courts refuse to apply the doctrine in nearly every case. In many,
perhaps most, of the decisions in which the abandonment doctrine is cited
with approval, the doctrine is unnecessary to the resolution of the case. Cop-
yright abandonment, accordingly, thus likely does relatively little to counter-
act the strongly proprietary trend of recent statutory enactments, which have
collectively tended to restrict the entry of new works into the public domain.
3. Abandonment by License
Perhaps influenced by highly restrictive judicial interpretations of the
copyright abandonment doctrine, open-content advocates have sought to fa-
cilitate the growth of an expressive commons by drafting what are, in es-
sence, copyright abandonment licenses-instruments that seek to express,
with maximum clarity, an author's attempt to abandon copyright and dedi-
cate a work to the public domain. These projects remain both incomplete and
untested. The very breadth and specificity of the extant abandonment li-
censes, however, only underscores the complexities entailed in seeking to
depart from the strongly proprietary regime of current law.
208 See, e.g., Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Pub. Group, 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 337
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Defendants invite the Court to boldly go where no court has gone before
and recognize the doctrine of limited abandonment. The Court declines the invitation."), arI'd
mem., 181 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1999). But see Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1114
(9th Cir. 1998) ("abandoning some rights is not the same as abandoning all rights"); FIs1mAN,
supra note 182, § 6.02[31 (questioning whether rule against limited abandonment still makes
sense in view of divisibility of copyright under the 1976 Act).
209 It is for precisely this reason that some authors have suggested altering abandonment
doctrine to permit partial, conditional abandonments of rights under copyright. See infra Part
W.A.
2' See also Johnson, supra note 70, at 400 (noting that one consequence of according a
work public-domain status is that it may be reused in ways objectionable to its author).
211 See 2 PATRY, supra note 157, § 5:155 ("It is difficult to fathom how, in ordinary
circumstances, one can be deemed to have abandoned one's copyright in a system of formality-
free, automatic protection, and where one can pick and choose whom to sue.").
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The Creative Commons project provides licenses designed to facilitate
dedications to the public domain. 2 One such license, the Creative Com-
mons Public Domain Dedication, states the author's intent to "dedicate[ ]
whatever copyright the [author] holds ... to the public domain,"2 3 with the
express recognition that this will permit "anyone for any purpose, commer-
cial or non-commercial" freely to "reproduce[ ], distribute[ ], transmit[ ],
use[ ], modif[y], buil[d] upon, or otherwise exploit" the work "including
by methods that have not yet been invented or conceived."' 1 4 Finally, the
license contains a number of terms aimed at assuring a permanent, irrevoca-
ble dedication:
Dedicator makes this dedication for the benefit of the public at
large and to the detriment of the Dedicator's heirs and successors.
Dedicator intends this dedication to be an overt act of relinquish-
ment in perpetuity of all present and future rights under copyright
law, whether vested or contingent, in the Work. Dedicator under-
stands that such relinquishment of all rights includes the relin-
quishment of all rights to enforce (by lawsuit or otherwise) those
copyrights in the Work.215
Although the Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication has at-
tracted some interest from makers of expressive works, 216 the Dedication
may be legally problematic. 217 Nothing in the Copyright Act contemplates a
voluntary extinguishment of the rights vested by the statute in the creator of
a work,2"8 and the courts have been highly reluctant to find copyright aban-
donment.21 9 Moreover, attempting to cut off the rights of heirs may present a
212 See Dusollier, supra note 8, at 1408; Corey Field, Copyright, Technology, and Time:
Perspectives on "Interactive" as a Term of Art in Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y
U.S.A. 49, 67 (2003); Goss, supra note 99, at 980; Rothman, supra note 127, at 1929 n.109.
213 Creative Commons, Copyright-Only Dedication (Based on United States Law) or Pub-
lic Domain Certification, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/publicdomain/ (last visited Apr.
2, 2010).2 14 Id.
215 Id.
216 See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Creative Commons and the New Intermediaries, 2006
MICH. ST. L. REV. 45, 55-56 (2006) (discussing the Open Clip Art Library).
217 See Diane L. Zimmerman, Living Without Copyright in a Digital World, 70 ALB. L.
REV. 1375, 1381 (2007) ("Creative Commons also purports to offer a license that allows cre-
ators to inject what they have produced into the public domain, or at least allows them to
try."). But cf. Matthew Dean Stratton, Will Lessig Succeed in Challenging the CTEA, Post-
Eldred?, 53 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'v U.S.A. 481, 522 (2006) (seemingly assuming that the Public
Domain Dedication is valid).
2' See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text; Zimmerman, supra note 217, at 1381
n.29 (observing that, "[a]lthough the statute has provisions that allow authors or their succes-
sors, under some circumstances, to terminate copyright grants, no where [sic] does it provide
a mechanism by which an author or successor to an author can disclaim copyright altogether."
(citations omitted)).
219 See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 47
Shrinking the Commons
conflict with the statute's termination provisions, which expressly invalidate
such commitments. 2 0
Recognizing these difficulties,2 ' Creative Commons launched a new
project to aid licensing of works in which no copyright rights are retained.
The result was a new model license known as "CCO" or "CC Zero. ' 2 2 Like
the Public Domain Dedication, the CCO license expressly abandons the au-
thor's copyright rights, but the CCO license includes additional terms (in the
form of a broad and unconditional license) designed to effectuate what is
functionally a dedication to the public domain even if the abandonment of
the author's rights under copyright is determined to be legally ineffective.
223
The CCO license includes a brief "Statement of Purpose" explaining
the licensor's intent in adopting the license:
Certain owners wish to permanently relinquish those [copyright
and related] rights to a Work for the purpose of contributing to a
commons of creative, cultural and scientific works ("Commons")
that the public can reliably and without fear of later claims of in-
fringement build upon, modify, incorporate in other works, reuse
and redistribute as freely as possible in any form whatsoever and
for any purposes, including without limitation commercial pur-
poses. These owners may contribute to the Commons to promote
the ideal of a free culture and the further production of creative,
cultural and scientific works, or to gain reputation or greater distri-
bution for their Work in part through the use and efforts of
others.
224
To implement that purpose, the CCO license next provides for an ex-
press abandonment of the author's copyright and related rights "[lto the
greatest extent permitted by . . . applicable law" "for the benefit of each
member of the public at large and to the detriment of Affirmer's heirs and
220 See infra Part II.B. 1.
221 Creative Commons summarized the problems facing the existing Public Domain Dedi-
cation as follows:
Dedicating works to the public domain is difficult if not impossible for those want-
ing to contribute their works for public use before applicable copyright term expires.
Few if any jurisdictions have a process for doing so easily. Laws vary from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction as to what rights are automatically granted and how and when
they expire or may be voluntarily relinquished. More challenging yet, many legal
systems effectively prohibit any attempt by copyright owners to surrender rights au-
tomatically conferred by law, particularly moral rights, even when the author wish-
ing to do so is well informed and resolute about contributing a work to the public
domain.
Creative Commons, About CCO-"No Rights Reserved", http://creativecominons.org/about/
ccO (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
222 Id.
223 See infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
224 Creative Commons, Creative Commons Legal Code, pmbl. http://creativecommons.
org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/legalcode (last visited Mar. 29, 2010) [hereinafter CC0 1.0 Legal
Code].
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successors, fully intending that such Waiver shall not be subject to revoca-
tion, rescission, cancellation, [or] termination[.]" 225 Should this attempt to
abandon copyright fail, the license confers in the alternative a broad and
unconditional license permitting free reuse of the works and a covenant not
to sue.
22 6
The CCO license improves upon the Public Domain Dedication in a
number of respects. The CCO license's Statement of Purpose, which lacks
any parallel in the Public Domain Dedication, may supply a useful interpre-
tive guide to courts or other authorities called upon to construe the license
insofar as it explicates and justifies the author's conscious determination to
forgo proprietary rewards in favor of building the commons. For lawyers and
policymakers steeped in copyright's historically dominant proprietary-pro-
duction paradigm, this concise introduction to the open-content movement's
alternative worldview may be highly valuable. The CCO license also recog-
nizes the potential legal infirmity of the clause abandoning copyright in the
work and, in classic open-content fashion, adapts itself to the potentially
hostile contours of existing law.
Other aspects of the CCO license, however, may prove problematic.
Both the abandonment clause and the alternative license clause emphasize
the intent to create a permanent and irrevocable change in the ownership
status of the copyright in the underlying work in order to expand the com-
mons. Existing U.S. law, however, may not comfortably accommodate a
transfer "to the detriment of Affirmer's heirs and successors" that "shall not
be subject to ... termination, ' 27 nor an "irrevocable . . . license[J 228 Such
provisions may run afoul of the termination rights the Copyright Act confers
upon the authors of expressive works, which cannot be waived or contracted
away. 229
Existing law, in sum, poses a number of obstacles to the growth of the
public domain as a commons of freely reusable expressive works. Several of
the routes by which expressive works once entered the public domain have
been curtailed or eliminated; indeed, the only circumstance the Copyright
Act presently expressly recognizes as ending protection under copyright for
U.S. works is through the expiration of the statutory term of protection. 20
The strong statutory presumption of continual proprietary protection influ-
ences other copyright policymakers, too; the courts, for their part, are ex-
ceedingly unlikely to find that an author has abandoned the rights vested
225 Id. § 2.
226 Id. § 3.
227 Id. § 2.
228 Id. § 3.
229 See infra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
230 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-04 (2006). The qualifier "for U.S. works" is necessary to avoid
the complicating effects of 17 U.S.C. § 104A, which provides for restoration of U.S. copyright
in some foreign works that had previously entered the public domain in the United States. But
see Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Colo. 2009) (invalidating this provision on
constitutional grounds).
[Vol. 47
Shrinking the Commons
automatically by statute from the moment of fixation. Although licensing
instruments exist that are designed to provide clear and unequivocal mani-
festations of intent to abandon copyright, those instruments, too, may not be
fully effective in the United States. This background illuminates the multiple
difficulties entailed in escaping from the strongly proprietary paradigm of
existing copyright law. Those same difficulties, in turn, may color the courts'
interpretations of the other method Congress selected in the Copyright Act
of 1976 for strengthening authors' proprietary control over uses of their
works: the statute's provisions governing terminations of copyright transfers
and licenses.
B. Termination of Transfers
1. Text and Purposes
In the early 1930s, writer Jerome Siegel and artist Joseph Shuster cre-
ated a comic-book character that came to acquire worldwide renown and
spawned a host of commercial spin-offs. Originally conceived as a villain
called "The Superman," Siegel and Shuster's character quickly evolved into
an archetypal hero (with a distinctive costume and a back-story involving
extraterrestrial origins), shed the "The" from his name, and took up crime-
fighting. 3' In March 1938, Siegel and Shuster executed an agreement "as-
sign[ing] to Detective Comics 'all [the] good will attached . .. and exclu-
sive right[s]' to Superman 'to have and hold forever.' "232 Siegel and Shuster
received $130 in exchange.233 Superman made his debut that spring in Action
Comics #1,234 and a franchise was bom. Superman made millions of dollars
for Detective Comics and its successors, but despite a series of negotiations
(and lawsuits) between the parties, Siegel and Shuster saw very little of this
money.2 35
Siegel and Shuster's situation exemplified a pattern that, the legislative
history suggests, occurred all too frequently: artists conveyed away their
231 See Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1102-05 (C.D. Cal.
2008) (describing origins and development of Superman). The Man of Steel has been a fixture
of copyright casebooks ever since. See, e.g., Nat'l Comics Publ'ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ'ns, Inc.,
191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951) (upholding validity of Detective Comics' copyright in Superman
comics in case alleging that they had been infringed by "Captain Marvel"); Detective Comics,
Inc. v. Bruns Publ'ns, Inc., 11 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940) (sustaining judgment for copyright
infringement against the creators of "Wonderman," a character differing from Superman
chiefly in the color of his costume).
232 Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1107.
233 Id. The parties also executed a later agreement providing for additional per-page royal-
ties for Siegel and Shuster's subsequent Superman stories and illustrations. The later agree-
ment, however, reconfirmed that exclusive ownership of the rights to Superman had already
been transferred to Detective Comics. See id.
234 Id. at 1110; see also id. at 1146-59 (reproducing the cover and thirteen-page Superman
story from Action Comics #).235 See id. at 1111-13.
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copyright interests in a work for a comparatively small sum and did not
share in the resulting profits when the work later proved to be commercially
valuable. In the years leading up to the passage of the Copyright Act of
1976, remedying these unremunerative transfers was identified as an impor-
tant congressional objective. The 1961 Report of the Register of Copyrights,
which proposed comprehensive copyright revision, noted that "authors are
often in a relatively poor bargaining position" as compared with publishers
and suggested that Congress should "permit them to renegotiate their trans-
fers that do not give them a reasonable share of the economic returns from
their works. 236 The Register singled out, as particularly problematic, trans-
fers of authors' rights in exchange for a one-time lump sum payment-just
the sort of agreement Siegel and Shuster had made. 37 To better protect au-
thors, the Register proposed that all transfers or assignments of copyright not
requiring continuing royalty payments should terminate automatically, by
operation of law, twenty years after they were made.238 When that proposal
encountered opposition, the Register proposed instead that authors be em-
powered (but not required) to terminate licenses or transfers of their rights
after a fixed period of time.239 Congress accepted this alternative proposal,
and it became part of the Copyright Act of 1976.240
2 3 6 
STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REGISTER'S REPORT ON THE
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 92 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter REGIS-
TER's REPORT]. The Register recognized that one mechanism aimed at providing such an op-
portunity for renegotiation-to wit, the grant of a separate renewal term of copyright to the
author at the expiration of the initial twenty-eight-year term of protection-already existed
under the 1909 Act. See id. at 53-54; see also supra note 166 (summarizing dual-term frame-
work). The reversion of renewal term rights, however, had failed adequately to protect authors
against the risk of unremunerative transfers, due in part to court decisions upholding authors'
assignments of renewal-term rights made during the initial twenty-eight-year term of the copy-
right. See, e.g., Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943). If authors
could validly contract away their renewal term rights at a time when their bargaining power
was thought to be weakest, then the separate renewal estate provided no real benefit. As the
Register observed: "It has become a common practice for publishers and others to take ad-
vance assignments of future renewal rights. Thus the reversionary purpose of the renewal pro-
vision has been thwarted to a considerable extent." REGISTER'S REPORT, supra, at 53. Although
later court decisions recognized that the renewal term rights would revert to the author's estate,
free and clear of any assignments or encumbrances made during the first term if the author
died before the vesting of the renewal term rights, those cases did nothing to reduce the risk of
unremunerative transfers where the author survived long enough for the renewal term rights
(and hence, the prior assignment of those rights to the publisher) to vest. See Stewart v. Abend,
495 U.S. 207 (1990); Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960). See
generally Stephen W. Tropp, It Had to be Murder or Will Be Soon-17 U.S.C. § 203 Termina-
tion of Transfers: A Call for Legislative Reform, 51 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'v U.S.A. 797, 804-06
(2004) (recounting some of this history).
237 See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text; REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 236,
at 93 ("The situation in which authors are most likely to receive less than a fair share of the
economic value of their works is that of an outright transfer for a lump sum.").
238 REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 236, at 93-94.
239 STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., SUPPLEMENTARY REGISTER'S
REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 71-76 (Comm. Print 1965);
Tropp, supra note 242, at 805-07.
2 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
[Vol. 47
Shrinking the Commons
The Copyright Act of 1976 included two provisions governing the ter-
mination of any transfer of license of copyright rights. The date of transfer at
issue determines which of the two termination provisions applies.
For transfers made on or after January 1, 1978, the relevant statutory
provision is § 203, captioned "Termination of Transfers and Licenses
Granted by the Author. '241 This termination provision applies to any "exclu-
sive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any
right under a copyright, executed by the author on or after January 1,
1978, '242 except for transfers by will or transfers involving works made for
hire.243
For living authors, the mechanics of termination are comparatively un-
complicated. The author may unilaterally terminate any transfer during a
five-year period that commences thirty-five years after the date of the origi-
nal grant,244 provided that the author gives the transferee at least two years
advance written notice. 245 If the grant is not terminated within the five-year
window, the transferee keeps the rights for the duration of the copyright,
unless the parties have agreed otherwise.246 When the termination becomes
effective, the rights conveyed in the original grant revert to the author,
247
with one important exception: derivative works prepared under the termi-
nated grant may continue to be utilized, but no new "derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work covered by the terminated grant" may be
created.248
The death of the original author complicates matters. The time period
during which termination may occur (a five-year window commencing
thirty-five years after the original transfer of rights) remains the same,249 as
does the written notice requirement.2 50 Different parties, however, become
241 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2006).
242 § 203(a). The words "by the author" signify that the termination provisions do not
govern "transfers by the author's successors in interest[.]" H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 125
(1976); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "transfer of copyright ownership").
243 See § 203(a).
244 § 203(a)(3). This general rule is subject to a proviso where the original grant of rights
included the right of publication of the work. In such a case, the five-year window during
which the transfer may be terminated begins at the earlier of: (1) forty years after the grant, or
(2) thirty-five years after publication of the work. Id.
245 § 203(a)(4). This provision of the statute also establishes requirements for the form and
content of the written notice. It further provides that notice of termination may not be given
more than ten years in advance. See id.
246 § 203(b)(6); see also Walthal v. Rusk, 172 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1999) (construing licens-
ing agreement that was silent as to duration as permitting termination at will at any time). But
cf Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 585-86 (9th Cir. 1993) (refusing to construe copy-
right licensing agreement as terminable at will). See generally H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 128
(noting that termination provisions were not intended to limit parties' freedom to negotiate a
license for a term shorter than thirty-five years).
247 17 U.S.C. § 203(b).
248 § 203(b)(1).
249 § 203(a)(3).
250 § 203(a)(4).
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entitled to terminate the grant.25' Rather than adopting a simple rule allowing
authors to decide who should be able to recapture their copyrights, Congress
established a statutory succession scheme enumerating the parties who be-
come entitled to terminate a grant of copyright rights following the death of
the original author.252 The parties who are entitled to terminate a deceased
author's transfer of rights are:
* In the case of an author survived by a spouse, but not by any children
or grandchildren, the author's surviving spouse holds the power to
terminate the transfer;
" In the case of an author survived by at least one child or grandchild,
but not by a spouse, the author's children share the termination rights
equally, with the author's grandchildren eligible to vote the shares of
their deceased parents on a per stirpes basis;
" In the case of an author survived both by a spouse and by at least one
child or grandchild, the spouse holds fifty percent of the termination
rights and the author's children collectively hold the other fifty per-
cent divided equally among them, with the same per stirpes rule for
grandchildren; and
" In the case of an author survived neither by a spouse nor by any
children or grandchildren, the author's executor, administrator, per-
sonal representative, or trustee enjoys the power to terminate grants
of the deceased author's copyright rights.253
Termination causes the granted rights to revert to the persons listed in the
statutory succession scheme.2 14
Parties cannot opt out of the termination regime. The statute specifi-
cally provides that "[t]ermination of the grant may be effected notwith-
standing any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a
will or to make any future grant. ' 255 Thus, every license or transfer of any
251 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2).
52 This policy choice has been criticized on the grounds that it interferes with an author's
freedom to dispose of her estate in accordance with her testamentary wishes. See Lee-ford
Tritt, Liberating Estates Law from the Constraints of Copyright, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 109, 167-82
(2006). Where the author is survived by a spouse, child, or grandchild, the rights to terminate
transfers made during the author's life and to recapture the transferred rights in the underlying
work pass to the author's statutory successors irrespective of the terms of the author's will. See,
e.g., Larry Spier, Inc. v. Bourne Co., 953 F.2d 774, 777-78 (2d Cir. 1992).
253 See § 203(a)(2)(A)-(D). The listing of statutory successors seems to enshrine, as a
matter of federal copyright law, a certain orthodoxy regarding "nuclear family" relationships
that predominated during the 1960s and 1970s when the statute was drafted. See Tritt, supra
note 252, at 181-82 (noting that blended and nontraditional families, as well as families
headed by same-sex or unmarried couples, are nowhere comprehended within the statutory
succession scheme established by the termination rules). The statute's disregard of nontradi-
tional family structures was even stronger before 1998, when Congress (without explanation)
added the paragraph permitting authors' executors, administrators, personal representatives, or
trustees to succeed to the author's termination rights. See 3 PArRY, supra note 157, § 7:61.
' See 17 U.S.C. § 203(b).
55 Id. § 203(a)(5) (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 125 (1976) ("al-
though affirmative action is needed to effect a termination, the right to take this action cannot
be waived in advance or contracted away."). This provision represented a reaction to court
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copyright interest is inherently and unavoidably conditional: it is subject to
future revocation by the author or the other persons named in the statute,
notwithstanding the author's stated desires or the provisions of the original
grant.256
Another part of the statute, § 304(c), governs the termination of trans-
fers made before January 1, 1978.257 Many of the provisions mirror those of
§ 203: the same individuals (living authors or a list of statutory successors)
hold termination rights, and the same provisions for written notice apply. 25s
There is, once again, a five-year window during which termination may oc-
cur, but it comes into being at a different time, measured not from the date of
the original transfer, but from the date copyright in the underlying work
attached. 2 9 Again, the statute forbids parties to contract around the termina-
tion rules.260
The termination provisions were intended to compensate for unequal
bargaining power as between authors and publishers who, Congress be-
decisions that had permitted contractual agreements between the parties to override Congress's
attempts to protect authors against unremunerative transfers by granting a new estate in the
renewal term. See supra note 221; Melville B. Nimmer, Termination of Transfers Under the
Copyright Act of 1976, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 947, 982-83 (1977).
The courts are presently divided on whether a new agreement between the same parties that
supersedes an earlier transfer and makes a new transfer of the same rights is an "agreement to
the contrary"-that is to say, whether the grantor retains the power to terminate the earlier
grant notwithstanding the provisions of the later agreement. Compare Penguin Group (USA) v.
Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193, 202-04 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding later agreement), with Classic
Media, Inc. v. Mewbom, 532 F.3d 978, 982-86 (9th Cir. 2008) (invalidating later agreement).
Although this disagreement may prove highly consequential as it affects the business relations
of authors and publishers, it is unlikely to carry much significance in the context of open-
content licensing. See generally Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Pooh-Poohing Copyright
Law's "Inalienable" Termination Rights (UC Berkeley Pub. Law, Research Paper No.
1525516, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1525516 (arguing that statutory provi-
sions should be construed to discourage opportunistic attempts by licensees to frustrate au-
thors' termination rights).
256 See Lemley, supra note 96, at 141-42; cf Robert A. Kreiss, Abandoning Copyrights to
Try to Cut Off Termination Rights, 58 Mo. L. REV. 85, 86 (1993) (because of statutory termina-
tion provisions, "an author's assignment of all his copyright rights is more like the conveyance
of a fee simple subject to condition subsequent than the conveyance of a fee simple absolute").
257 See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c).
258 See § 304(c)(1), (2), (4). The grants subject to termination are somewhat broader under
§ 304(c) insofar as they include grants made other than by the original author, although the
distinction is unimportant for present purposes. See generally H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at
140-42 (summarizing key differences between termination provisions of §§ 203 and 304(c)).
259 § 304(c)(3) ("Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a period of
five years beginning at the end of fifty-six years from the date copyright was originally se-
cured, or beginning on January 1, 1978, whichever is later."). By permitting termination of
existing assignments fifty-six years after the vesting of the initial copyright, Congress meant to
ensure that authors and their successors, rather than assignees, benefited from the 1976 Act's
extension of the second copyright term from twenty-eight to forty-seven years. See H.R. REP.
No. 94-1476, at 140 ("the extended term represents a completely new property right, and there
are strong reasons for giving the author, who is the fundamental beneficiary of copyright under
the Constitution, an opportunity to share in it"). Congress repeated this step in 1995, when it
again extended the duration of existing copyrights by twenty years and gave authors a new
termination opportunity. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(d); 3 PATRY, supra note 157, § 7:62.
260 § 304(c)(5).
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lieved, could acquire rights for a comparative pittance and then grow
wealthy off the author's work.26' By allowing authors unilaterally to termi-
nate unremunerative transfers, and by forbidding the parties to contract
around the statute, Congress effectively gave authors and their heirs a sec-
ond bite at the apple, thereby permitting them to recapture their rights and
negotiate for more favorable licensing terms after time had revealed the true
value of the author's work. 62
The Superman case illustrates the termination provisions in operation.
Siegel and Shuster parted in 1938 with rights that proved to be worth vastly
more than the $130 they received.263 Jerome Siegel died on January 28,
1996.61 On April 3, 1997, Siegel's widow and daughter served written termi-
nation notices under § 304(c), with a stated effective termination date of
April 16, 1999, seeking to terminate the 1938 assignments of rights to the
Superman character. 265 The court noted the complexity of § 304(c)'s termina-
tion provisions, which it portrayed, with some justification, as a barrier to
the parties' exercise of their rights.266 Nevertheless, it concluded that Siegel's
heirs had satisfied the requirements of § 304(c) and rejected a number of
defenses raised by Siegel's assignees.267 "After seventy years," the court
concluded, "Jerome Siegel's heirs regain what he granted so long ago-the
copyright in the Superman material that was published in Action Comics,
Vol. 1."268
The Superman case confirms that the statute's termination provisions
may be employed in a fashion that furthers Congress's intent to redress un-
remunerative transfers and remedy unequal bargaining power. That circum-
stance, however, does not limit the application of the statute. To the contrary,
both the text of the statute and recent case law tend to suggest that the termi-
nation provisions apply even to an author's voluntary release of a copy-
righted work under an open-content license, which clearly does not involve
26 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 ("A provision of this sort is needed because of the
unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of determining
a work's value until it has been exploited.").
262 This policy choice has been criticized on the grounds that it enables an author's heirs-
who have themselves created nothing-to extract continuing rents based on the author's crea-
tion, to the detriment of the public. See William F. Patry, The Failure of the American Copy-
right System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 932-33 (1997); cf
Deven R. Desai, Copyright's Hidden Assumption: A Critical Analysis of the Foundations of
Descendible Copyright (Mar. 5, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1353746 (sug-
gesting that rhetoric in copyright debate surrounding the need to provide for authors' heirs has
been strategically deployed to mask the real underlying battle between the interests of authors
and publishers, and that the public's status as the ultimate beneficiary of authors' creativity has
been unjustly overlooked).
263 See supra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.
264 Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
265 Id. at 1114. Shuster's heirs did likewise, although their rights were not before the court
that heard the case involving Siegel's termination. See id. at 1114 n.3.
2
"See id. at 1117.
267 See id. at 1117-39.268 ld. at 1145.
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the problem of unequal bargaining power that the termination provisions
were designed to remedy.
2. Termination of Open-Content Licenses
A literal reading of the Copyright Act's termination provisions suggests
possible difficulty for users of works distributed under the various open-
content licensing arrangements illustrated earlier.269 Each of the open-con-
tent licenses considered above authorizes members of the public to copy, to
distribute, and (in most cases) to modify the licensed works, 270 actions that
would otherwise be reserved by statute to the copyright holder alone. Thus,
every open-content license creates a "nonexclusive grant of a ... license of
... any right under a copyright"2 7 within the meaning of the statute's termi-
nation provision.27 2 Accordingly, individual contributors273 to a host of open-
content projects would appear to be empowered under the statute to termi-
nate licenses and recapture the copyright rights in their contributions to the
project.2 74 Existing derivative works based on those contributions could con-
tinue to be used, but no new derivatives could be created.2 71 Thus, although
the issue is less than perfectly clear, the existing statutory text suggests that
open-content licenses are not (and cannot be) truly perpetual, notwithstand-
ing the intent of licensors and the settled understandings of the open-content
user community. 276
269 See supra Parts II.B-C. Because all the open-content licenses discussed above were
promulgated, and all the works licensed thereunder were licensed, after January 1, 1978, the
pertinent termination provision is § 203.
270 See generally supra Part II.A. The exception would be for works licensed under one of
the Creative Commons "No Derivatives" (ND) variants, or to designated Invariant Sections of
documents licensed under the GFDL. See supra notes 116, 128-30 and accompanying text.
271 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2006).
272 In general, open-content licenses do not constitute "transfers of copyright ownership"
as that term is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101, because they are, by their terms, nonexclusive-that
is, the licenses do not preclude the author from licensing the same rights in the work to other
licensees. Nonexclusive licensing arrangements fall outside the definition of "transfers of cop-
yright ownership" in § 101, but are expressly made subject to the statute's termination provi-
sion in § 203(a).
273 As noted above, the statute's termination provisions do not apply to works made for
hire-for example, a work prepared by an employee within the scope of employment.
§ 203(a); see also supra notes 200, 243 and accompanying text. In the specific context of
FOSS, this limitation on the scope of the statute's termination provision may be highly rele-
vant, in view of the growing number of technology firms whose employees participate in
open-source software development as part of their employment. See DON TAPscoTirr &
ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: How MASS COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 92
(2006) ("No longer just an ad-hoc collection of individual volunteers, most of the participants
in the Linux ecosystem are paid employees of Fortune 100 tech firms.").
274 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(b).275 See id. § 203(b)(1).
276 Additional counterarguments against this plain-language reading of the statute are con-
sidered infra Part IV.A.
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Recent case law, although not directly on point, nevertheless provides
support for this reading of the statute. In Jacobsen v. Katzer,27 7 Jacobsen
released copyrighted software code under the so-called Artistic License,2 7 a
FOSS-type license279 that permitted copying, modification, and reuse of the
software subject to attribution and copyleft conditions.8 0 Katzer copied Ja-
cobsen's code into his own software without complying with the terms of the
Artistic License,2 1 and Jacobsen sued for copyright infringement.282 Katzer
argued, and a federal district court agreed, that his breach of the terms of the
Artistic License gave rise to liability, if at all, only for breach of contract, not
for infringement of copyright in Jacobsen's software.283 Reversing, the Fed-
eral Circuit held that the Artistic License was a valid copyright license and
that if the licensee failed to honor the conditions stated in the license, then
the licensee could no longer claim to be entitled to exercise the rights
granted therein. 214 Although the Court of Appeals' opinion considered only
the terms of the Artistic License, its reasoning has been thought to validate
the enforceability of other open-content licenses as well.25 If open-content
277 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
278 The language of the applicable version 1.0 of the Artistic License is available at The
Perl Foundation, Artistic License 1.0, http://www.perlfoundation.org/artistic-license_ 10 (last
visited Mar. 30, 2010).
279 Revision 1.0 of the Artistic License was not approved by either the FSF or OSI. See
supra note 48 (noting those organizations' lists of software licenses that have been found com-
patible with their respective principles). Subsequent revisions brought the license into compli-
ance with both the FSF's and OSI's principles. See The Perl Foundation, Artistic License 2.0,
http://www.perlfoundation.org/artistic-license_2 2_0 (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). This later revi-
sion of the license was not at issue in Jacobsen v. Katzer. Nevertheless, even the earlier version
of the Artistic License was clearly aimed at building a commons of freely reusable expressive
works, and in that sense it may be recognized as a FOSS-type license notwithstanding its
deviations from some of the principles enunciated by the FSF and OSI.
280 This is a slight, but inconsequential, oversimplification. The actual conditions attached
to the Artistic License 1.0 are quoted in the court's opinion. See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d
1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
281 Id. at 1376-77.
282 Id. at 1375-76.
283 See Jacobsen v. Katzer, No. 06-CV-01905, 2007 WL 2358628 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17,
2007), rev'd, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Interpreting open-content licenses as imposing
mere contractual obligations has been recognized as problematic on several fronts, ranging
from the difficulty of demonstrating assent by the licensee, to problems involving the existence
of consideration, to the difficulty of ascertaining damages in the event of breach where the
underlying work was given away for free. See, e.g., Asay, supra note 95, at 285-86; Gonzilez,
supra note 47; Kumar, supra note 50, at 16-24; Wacha, supra note 95, at 457-59, 481-83. But
cf Gomulkiewicz, supra note 73, at 346 ("There seems to be a mistaken belief that things are
either licenses or contracts when, in fact, most of the time, they are both contracts and li-
censes-that is, contracts that contain licenses." (footnotes omitted)).
284 See Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1381-83; see also, e.g., Gomulkiewicz, supra note 73, at
340-43 (describing the case); Michael J. Madison, Notes on a Geography of Knowledge, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2056-57 (2009) (same).
285 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 95, at 787 (labeling Jacobsen a "landmark case");
Gomulkiewicz, supra note 73, at 346 (noting that Jacobsen confirmed the enforceability of
FOSS licenses and the availability of injunctive relief in the event of breach); Vetter, supra
note 85, at 2089-90 ("If the district court's analysis in Jacobsen v. Katzer had remained, it
would have undermined a foundational premise of FOSS licenses.").
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licenses are valid and enforceable as licenses under copyright law, however,
then there would appear to be little justification for declining to apply the
provision of the Copyright Act governing termination of such licenses.
Termination of an open-content license would have effects on the un-
derlying project that, while difficult to predict, are unlikely to be salutary.
Consider an example from the FOSS world: software development has been
recognized as an irreducibly complex process insofar as the production of
software works exceeding a certain (and comparatively rudimentary) level of
complexity is a challenge beyond any individual developer.28 6 To make all
but the simplest programs, therefore, multiple programmers must collabo-
rate. When they do so within the hierarchical structure of a single firm, no
copyright issues arise from one programmer's reuse of another's work be-
cause the employer holds the copyright to each employee's contributions
under the work made for hire rule. 287 In contrast, contributors to FOSS
projects must coordinate their activities outside any single hierarchical struc-
ture. 88 Open-content licenses make such coordination lawful; they substitute
for the hierarchical structure of a firm by allowing each contributor to the
project to adapt and reuse code contributed by earlier contributors. Each
FOSS work, in other words, is protected by not one copyright, but many:
each contributor's contributions are individually protected from the moment
of fixation, but then licensed for free reuse by members of the public.289 If
any of those underlying licenses is terminated, however, then the project
may be effectively stymied, for the creation of further derivative works
based upon the terminating author's contribution would be prohibited.29
Although the FOSS community has never experienced an instance of
license termination, one recent case did raise the possibility that code con-
tributed to a FOSS project long ago was not validly licensed. The essence of
the complaint in SCO v. IBM was that IBM had contributed code to the
Linux kernel that was actually copyrighted by plaintiff SCO.2 9 ' SCO's case
foundered when a district court found that it did not actually own the code in
which it claimed copyright.219 2 While the case was pending, however, it ap-
peared that Linux software developers would have to review an indetermi-
286 See WEBER, supra note 9, at 59 ("there are inherent limits to software that can be built
by one or two people").
287 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006).
288 See WEBER, supra note 9, at 62-65.
289 See Vetter, supra note 68, at 81 (describing the "web of license interdependency"
among contributors to a FOSS project).2
1 See § 203(b)(1).
291 See Kerry D. Goettsch, Recent Development, SCO Group v. IBM: The Future of Open-
Source Software, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 581, 583-84 (2003); Zittrain, supra note 9,
at 266-67.
292 See SCO Group v. Novell, Inc., No. 2:04CV139DAK, 2007 WL 2327587, at *35 (D.
Utah Aug. 10, 2007). On March 30, 2010, following a trial, a jury found that the terms of the
parties' asset purchase agreement did not result in a transfer of copyright in the underlying
code to SCO. SCO Group, Inc. v. Novell, Inc., No. 2:04-CV-139 TS, Special Verdict Form
Mar. 30, 2010 (copy on file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation).
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nate portion of the millions of lines of code that made up the Linux kernel,
extract any portions of the code copyrighted by SCO, and write noninfring-
ing replacement code-a potentially daunting prospect.2 93 The termination
provisions of the Copyright Act, however, make every FOSS contributor
another potential SCO: contributors may revoke permission, years after the
fact, to copy and reuse their contributions, thereby potentially requiring sig-
nificant re-engineering of open-content projects.
Several factors likely contribute to explaining why the Copyright Act's
termination provisions have gone largely unrecognized as a source of poten-
tial trouble within the open-content community thus far. First, too little time
has passed to make termination an immediate and concrete threat. To take a
purely hypothetical example, consider a FOSS work licensed under the GPL
and released on August 25, 1991.294 The earliest possible date for termination
of the license for that work under § 203 would be August 25, 2026, thirty-
five years after the date of the grant. The latest possible termination date
would be August 25, 2031, forty years after the grant.295 Notice of termina-
tion would have to be served between August 25, 2016 and August 25,
2029.296 Thus, even the very earliest works issued under open-content li-
censes will not become subject to possible termination until several years
from now. Nevertheless, the mere possibility of future termination likely
conflicts with user expectations in the open-content community, which pre-
sume that the licensed works will remain available for free use in
perpetuity.29 7
Second, termination may be viewed as less of a threat within the open-
content community because contributors to that community who act from a
desire to build a commons of freely reusable expressive works are thought
not to be likely to change their minds and seek to reacquire proprietary rights
in their works. 98 Not all open-content contributors share that motive, how-
ever,29 9 and it is naYve to assume that none of the millions of individuals
who have contributed to open-content projects will ever become interested
in recapturing copyright rights. Furthermore, it is not only the contributors'
293 See Vetter, supra note 68, at 81 & n.62 (noting that even this alternative would leave
downstream users of the kernel in a potentially vulnerable position).
294 FOSS aficionados will recognize August 25, 1991 as the date of the first public an-
nouncement by programmer Linus Torvalds of the project that became the Linux operating
system. See KELTY, supra note 10, at 215.
295 See generally supra note 244 and accompanying text.
296 To be more precise, the notice must be served no earlier than ten years before the
earliest available date in the five-year termination window and no later than two years before
the latest possible termination date, but in no event may the licensor provide less than two
years' notice. See generally supra note 245 and accompanying text.
297 See supra notes 74-76, 120-29, 134-42 and accompanying text.
298 This may be especially true for partisans of the "free software" side of the "free and
open-source" conceptual divide. See supra note 47. Those who see the avoidance of proprie-
tary entanglement as a moral imperative may understandably be less likely to depart from that
position than those who view commons-based peer production in more technical terms.
299 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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own wishes that must be considered, for the termination power expressly
extends to the contributors' statutory heirs,3°° who may or may not share the
contributors' views as to the importance of a vibrant informational
commons.
Finally, the possibility of termination may simply be perceived as a risk
about which little can be done under the present state of the law. Open-
content licenses preserve a commons of informational works because it is
well settled (as Jacobsen illustrates) that the author of a work may attach
enforceable conditions to authorized uses of the work.3°0 There is no compa-
rably settled doctrine, however, in favor of the making of a permanent and
non-terminable license of rights under copyright. The statute, to the contrary,
expressly circumscribes private action to create a non-terminable license. 02
Further, judicial skepticism toward the nearest existing analogue-copyright
abandonment 3°3-may reveal much about the limited opportunity available
for open-content advocates to leverage existing law. Or, to adapt an analogy
frequently deployed in commentaries on the FOSS phenomenon, the "legal
jujitsu"3°4 that sustains the open-content commons requires something to
push against; when the issue is the creation of a perpetual, non-terminable
license, that "something" may be absent.
3. Termination of Dedications to the Public Domain
The same logic may suggest trouble for an author's attempt to abandon
copyright and dedicate a work to the public domain, particularly via special-
ized copyright licenses.30 When copyright rights attach automatically upon
fixation and formalities are irrelevant, it is quite possible that a court may
construe an author's post-fixation dedication of the work to the public do-
main as a "nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license or copyright or of any
right under a copyright"3°6 that is necessarily subject to the statute's termina-
tion provisions. This interpretation would allow the author to terminate her
abandonment of copyright and recapture proprietary rights in the work.
This issue remains underexamined in the literature to date.30 7 Nearly a
generation ago, Professor Robert Kreiss examined the interplay of the stat-
" See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
301 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
" See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(5), 304(c)(5) (2006); see also supra notes 255-56 and accom-
panying text.
303 See generally supra Part I.A.2.
3' BENKLER, supra note 11, at 65. See generally supra note 99 and accompanying text.
305 See generally supra Part lI.A.3.
306 17 U.S.C. § 203(a).
31 See FjsmMAN, supra note 182, § 6.02[4] (suggesting that terminating one's own aban-
donment of copyright may be possible, but that users of the work who believed it to be in the
public domain should prevail on an equitable estoppel defense to any infringement claim);
Phillip Johnson, "Dedicating" Copyright to the Public Domain, 71 MOD. L. REv. 587, 608-09
(2008) (also suggesting that dedications to the public domain are revocable by licensor subject
to estoppel defenses).
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ute's termination provisions and the doctrine of copyright abandonment.3 °8
Professor Kreiss, however, viewed the issue in a seemingly idiosyncratic
context, asking whether the exclusive licensee of a copyrighted work (rather
than the author of that work) could somehow "abandon" copyright in the
work as a means of thwarting the licensor's power to terminate the license.1 9
Professor Kreiss reasoned that the licensee had no power to "abandon"
rights it did not actually hold and that the licensee's purported abandonment
of copyright in the work would not prevent the licensor from recovering
those rights via the termination provisions. This possibility, although seem-
ingly plausible given the breadth of the statutory termination clause, would
surely surprise members of the public who had relied on the licensee's truth-
ful statements that "we hold the exclusive rights to this work, and we hereby
dedicate said work to the public domain."310
The point is not that members of the public would necessarily be liable
for copyright infringement in the event of termination of an author's dedica-
tion of a work to the public domain. Perhaps accused infringers could prevail
under an estoppel theory.3 1 Or perhaps they could argue that construing the
statute to allow recapture of proprietary rights in a work previously in the
public domain is unconstitutional.312 The point, rather, is that under the cur-
rently existing provisions of the Copyright Act, there appears to be little the
author can do ex ante to make her own dedication of a work to the public
domain perpetual and irrevocable.
Although private parties may be statutorily disabled from crafting li-
censing instruments that avoid the Copyright Act's termination provisions,
there are some possible arguments that courts might employ to effectuate a
licensor's intent in making a non-terminable grant. As discussed below, how-
ever, these arguments may not fully match the force of the argument for
termination of an open-content license based on the statute's literal text.
IV. CONSTRUING LICENSES TO AVOID TERMINATION
Siegel and Shuster gave up the legal right to control Superman and
received $130.313 Linus Torvalds did the same with the Linux operating sys-
tem and received zero dollars.3 14 What separates the two scenarios, beyond
the obvious, is the absence in the latter of any recognizable form of coercion.
An author's voluntary selection of an open-content license cannot plausibly
308 See Kreiss, supra note 256.
3 1 See id. at 87-90.311 See id. at 112.
311 See supra note 307.
322 See Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Colo. 2009); Yochai Benkler, Free As
the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74
N.Y.U. L. REv. 354 (1999); cf infra note 336 and accompanying text.
"I See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
314 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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be analogized to a transaction in which a powerful licensee pressures an
author into an unremunerative exchange. The Copyright Act's termination
provisions were enacted to strengthen authors' resistance to such pressures,
and courts may rightly question why the statute should be applied in circum-
stances, such as open-content licensing, where these pressures are manifestly
absent.
A. Modifying Copyright Abandonment
Professor Lydia Pallas Loren recently made a cogent and forceful argu-
ment that Creative Commons licenses should not be subject to termina-
tion.315 Professor Loren noted that allowing a licensor to "terminate" a
Creative Commons license and recapture full ownership of copyright in the
licensed work would be unjust in two distinct respects. First, it would flout
the intent of the author as expressed at the time the work was created.316
Second, it would unfairly surprise members of the public who reasonably
relied on the author's assurances that the content was free to copy.31 7 Profes-
sor Loren concluded that the courts should craft a new doctrine of limited
copyright abandonment that would preclude application of the Copyright
Act's termination provisions to grants that are (1) overt, (2) clear, and (3) to
the public.31s Although Professor Loren focused her analysis on the Creative
Commons family of licenses, the definition she proposed to employ for lim-
ited copyright abandonment would apply equally to other open-content li-
censes (or, indeed, to an author's express abandonment of copyright in a
work).
Nevertheless, it may be a mistake to rely too heavily on the courts to
create a novel doctrine of limited copyright abandonment. Precedent is
against it, as Professor Loren recognized. 39 A number of considerations,
moreover, may make the courts less inclined to resist the force of stare deci-
sis here.
First, although permitting termination of a Creative Commons license
would be inconsistent with the intent of the author at the time of publication,
the statute's termination provisions make the author's original intent non-
dispositive: they allow authors to change their minds (by forbidding waiver
315 See Lydia Pallas Loren, Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: Enforce-
ment of Creative Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright, 14 GEO. MASON
L. REv. 271 (2007).
316 See id. at 297 (arguing that when an author elects to "select[ ] a semicommons status
for his work" rather than full copyright protection, "the law should recognize the binding
nature of that commitment.").
37 See id. at 295 ("When a work is marked with a notice that it is licensed under a
Creative Commons license, the public is informed that instead of the default rules of copyright
law, some uses that copyright law would prohibit are instead permitted.").
318 Id. at 323-24.
39 See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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of termination rights)32 ° and permit parties other than the author (if the au-
thor is dead) to decide whether termination occurs.32'
Second, the reliance argument-that members of the public, having
reasonably relied on the provisions of the author's Creative Commons grant,
are entitled not to have the grant terminated-is ultimately circular, because
the public's reliance is reasonable only if the grant is not subject to termina-
tion in the first instance. A court might just as readily reason that when
members of the public receive a grant of rights under an open-content li-
cense, they do so with express statutory notice that all such grants are termi-
nable and can have no reasonable basis for relying on the license being
permanent.
Third, although Professor Loren correctly notes that the termination
provisions seem to apply most naturally to arm' s-length transactions between
two named parties, rather than an author's release of rights to unknown (and
unknowable) members of the public,3 22 the statutory text imposes no require-
ments as to the form of the parties' transaction.3 23 Indeed, the statute is con-
spicuously broad; the termination power extends to any "exclusive or
nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under
a copyright."312 4 As one court recognized, "common sense, good business
judgment and even a modicum of legal intuition dictate that a transfer should
clearly name the transferee, [but] neither the statute nor the case law require
it." 325
In sum, although a new doctrine of limited copyright abandonment may
avoid the risks that the termination provisions presently pose to users of
works distributed under open-content licenses, it is far from clear that ex-
isting doctrine is sufficiently flexible to accommodate such a development.
As an alternative, however, the courts may be able to justify limits on termi-
320 See R. Anthony Reese, Are Creative Commons Licenses Forever?: Authors' Termina-
tion Rights and Open-Content Licensing (Aug. 31, 2009) (unpublished manuscript at 15, on
file with author) (noting that the "statute's policy is clearly to allow the author... to change
her mind, terminate [a] transfer, and attempt to resell the recaptured rights," and that "it is not
clear that the same policy should not apply in the Creative Commons situation").
321 See supra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
322 See Loren, supra note 315, at 319 (noting that Creative Commons licenses "do not
contain an execution date (nor do they contain a signature)" and do not identify licensees to
whom termination notices would need to be sent). This characteristic typifies open-content
licenses, which do not mimic the form of arm's-length transactions. See supra notes 30-33 and
accompanying text.
323 Professor Anthony Reese has also highlighted sound policy justifications against limit-
ing the scope of authors' termination rights to those grants signed by the author. See Reese,
supra note 320, manuscript at 9-13.
31 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2006); see also id. § 304(c) (termination power reaches "the ex-
clusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of the renewal copyright or any right
under it").
32 Sunham Home Fashions, LLC v. Pem-Am., Inc., 2002 WL 31834477, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 17, 2002), aft'd, 83 Fed. App'x 369 (2d Cir. 2003). It would be odd, as well, to hold
nonexclusive licenses to a higher standard of formal regularity than actual transfers of copy-
right ownership.
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nation of open-content licenses by analogy to the abandonment provisions of
the Patent Act.
B. Patent Abandonment and the Copyright Act
The first person who "invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful im-
provement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor," '326 so long as the invention
is useful,3 27 novel,32 and nonobvious, 3 29 and so long as none of a series of
statutory exceptions bars the issuance of the patent.330
Although inventors may patent their discoveries, they are not obliged to
do so. Nearly two centuries ago, the Supreme Court recognized an inventor's
right to "abandon his invention, and surrender or dedicate it to the pub-
lic."33' This right also has been expressly recognized in the patent statutes
continuously since 1839.332 It is recognized today in § 102(c), which bars an
award of patent if the inventor "has abandoned the invention. 33 3 The touch-
stone under § 102(c) is whether the inventor clearly intended to dedicate the
invention to the public.3 4 Thus, under the Patent Act, inventors may ex-
pressly relinquish rights in their inventions for the benefit of the public-
either expressly under § 102(c) or by taking any of the other actions that the
statute specifies as barring patentability. 35 The result in either case is that the
invention enters the public domain and may not thereafter be patented.336
Given that the Patent Act and the Copyright Act are two different stat-
utes, the presence of clear avenues of abandonment in the one may not nec-
essarily say much about the apparent lack of similar provisions in the other.
On multiple occasions, however, the Supreme Court has suggested that the
326 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). Although the words "first person" do not appear in § 101, this
is the practical effect of § 102(f) (2006), which bars the award of a patent to a person who "did
not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented."
327 Id.
328 Id. § 102(a), (e)-(g).
329 d. § 103(a).
330 See id. § 102(b)-(d).
131 Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 16 (1829); see also Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322,
329 (1858).
332 See Patent Act of 1839, ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat. 353, 354 (entitling applicant to patent
"except on proof of abandonment of such invention to the public").
333 § 102(c). The phrasing of this provision, although grounded in Supreme Court deci-
sions like Pennock, is infelicitous; it would be more precise to say that the inventor has "aban-
doned" her right to obtain a patent on the invention. See, e.g., ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT
LAw ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 123 (2004).
334 See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 1977 U.S. Ct. Cl. 578 (1977).
... See supra note 330 and accompanying text. For example, an inventor might achieve the
same result as an express abandonment of the invention under § 102(c) simply by failing to
submit a patent application for more than one year after offering the invention for sale to the
public, which would bar patentability under § 102(b).
316 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) ("Congress may not authorize the
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or
to restrict free access to materials already available.").
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two statutes are joined by common purposes and should be interpreted har-
moniously with one another. Indeed, the Court has twice read the Copyright
Act as if it included language that actually appears in the Patent Act.337
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,"' the Court
considered whether Sony, the manufacturer of the "Betamax" video cassette
recorder ("VCR"), was contributorily liable for incidents of copyright in-
fringement that occurred when Betamax owners recorded copyrighted televi-
sion programming without permission. To answer that question, the Court
(per Justice Stevens) shifted the rhetorical landscape from copyright law to
patent law, based on their "historic kinship."33 9 The Patent Act, the Court
observed, implicitly excused the sale of "a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use"34° from the scope of
liability for patent infringement. The Court adopted this rule as a matter of
copyright law, despite the absence of any comparable language in the text of
the Copyright Act.34' Because the Betamax VCR was capable of at least two
non-infringing uses (authorized recording and "time-shifting," which the
Court determined to be a fair use even if unauthorized),3 42 it qualified as a
"staple article of commerce." Therefore, the Court concluded, "Sony's sale
of such equipment to the general public does not constitute contributory in-
fringement of respondents' copyrights. '343
Twenty years after Sony, the Court again considered the issue of secon-
dary liability for the manufacturer of a copying technology. The question in
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.344 was whether the
producers of the Grokster and Morpheus file-sharing software programs
were secondarily liable for copyright infringements by users of those pro-
grams. Lower courts, relying on Sony and then-existing doctrines of secon-
dary liability, held that they were not.345
... The Court's analytical approach in these cases might readily be criticized, of course.
See, e.g., WILLiLm D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 183-85 (1999) (arguing that different statutes are essentially the products of
different authors writing for different audiences, and should not be interpreted as the work of a
single creator); Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CAL. L. Rav. 941,
981-82 (2007) (criticizing Court's borrowing of patent concepts when construing the Copy-
right Act).
338 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
339 Id. at 439.
3435 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982).
341 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. The Court held that "the sale of copying equipment, like the
sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product
is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of
substantial noninfringing uses." Id.
342 See id. at 443-47 (noting approval or acquiescence by many large copyright holders in
public taping of their broadcasts), 447-55 (finding "time-shifting," or the recording of a
broadcast for a single viewing at a later time, to be noninfringing under fair use doctrine).343 Id. at 456.
'44 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
" Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1162-66 (9th
Cir. 2004), rev'd, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
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The Supreme Court responded by borrowing a new theory of liability,
nowhere stated in the Copyright Act, from the patent statute. The Patent Act
includes a provision stating that "[w]hoever actively induces infringement
of a patent shall be liable as an infringer. 3 46 The Court, per Justice Souter
(writing for three Justices), declared that:
For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of
patent law as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the in-
ducement rule, too, is a sensible one for copyright. We adopt it
here, holding that one who distributes a device with the object of
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expres-
sion or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is lia-
ble for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties. 47
Read broadly, Sony and Grokster supply a possible answer to the argu-
ment that partial or total abandonments of an author's copyright interests are
necessarily impermanent. Copyright and patent, the argument would go, are
closely related.3 48 If Congress, in drafting the Copyright and Patent Acts,
omitted provisions in one statute that nevertheless appear relevant to the
other, the courts should not lightly presume that the difference in language
reflects a difference in legislative intent. Rather, courts should (as the Su-
preme Court did in both Sony and Grokster) consult the purposes behind the
statutory language in one statute and ask whether the purpose justifies read-
ing the other statute in a parallel fashion.
The Patent Act's abandonment provisions exist to protect, in the Su-
preme Court's words, "the unquestionable right of every inventor to confer
gratuitously the benefits of his ingenuity upon the public. 3 49 Copyright pol-
icy provides no basis to deny authors the opportunity to confer a similar
public benefit. An abandoned invention irrevocably enters the public domain
and cannot thereafter be withdrawn.5 0 The same consequence should follow
an author's decision to grant rights in her work to the public, whether partial
(under an open-content license) or in toto (via abandonment). If we recog-
nize authors' rights to permit free copying and modification of their works, it
should follow that those rights can be made (as they are under the patent
statute) permanent, irrevocable, and not subject to termination.
There is reason to doubt, however, whether the courts will read the
Patent Act's abandonment provision into the Copyright Act in the same way
that Sony and Grokster imported some of the patent statute's liability provi-
sions. In both Sony and Grokster, the Copyright Act was silent on the ques-
tion before the court, and the question was whether the court would fill this
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006).
7 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37.
348 Grokster, 545 U.S. 913; Sony, 464 U.S. 417.
349 Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 329 (1858).
350 See supra notes 331-36 and accompanying text.
2010]
Harvard Journal on Legislation
gap by referring to language in the Patent Act.35' A court may be less willing
to borrow language from the Patent Act where the effect is not to fill in a
gap, but rather to displace language (to wit, the termination provisions) that
actually appears in the Copyright Act. Furthermore, patent abandonment is a
component of a larger regime that places the burden of seeking protection
squarely on the inventor. 52 It makes sense to extend binding force to an
inventor's decision to abandon an invention (or to take one of the other steps
that negates patentability) in a regime that makes the inventor's action deter-
minative of the invention's legal status; where protection exists automati-
cally irrespective of the author's conduct, as in copyright, courts may be less
inclined to attach permanent and irreversible consequences to the author's
statements. Finally, absent an authoritative construction of the statute from
the Supreme Court, lingering uncertainty as to the proper judicial construc-
tion of the copyright statute and whether the courts will permit termination,
may itself chill the use of open-content licenses in the interim. The better
alternative, therefore, may be to seek a statutory amendment.
V. REFORMING COPYRIGHT TO PRESERVE OPEN CONTENT
Congress, seemingly acting from a praiseworthy desire to benefit au-
thors, unwittingly created an obstacle to the ability of authors purposefully
to expand the commons through the use of open-content licenses. The statu-
tory termination provisions, which were designed to remedy unremunerative
transfers, may apply by their terms even to licensing arrangements that pose
none of the risks that moved Congress to act. With the courts ill-positioned
to remedy the problem, it makes sense to seek legislative action to place a
firmer legal footing under open-content projects.
The termination provisions, as with much of the remainder of the Copy-
right Act, presuppose a production scheme in which authors' proprietary in-
terests dominate; indeed, Congress justified the termination provisions
precisely because they further authors' interests in capturing the economic
returns for their work.353 The statute's baseline assumption that all authors
wish to capture the full economic value of the works they produce has been
placed in doubt by the success of the open-content movement.35 4 That move-
"' See supra notes 341, 347 and accompanying text.
352 See supra notes 326-30 and accompanying text.
313 See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
" Professor Reese has argued that this is not so and that it is perfectly foreseeable that
authors may wish temporarily to permit reuse of their works by open-content projects, then
later recapture and market the rights in their contributions. See Reese, supra note 320, manu-
script at 19 ("Interpreting Section 203 to apply to Creative Commons licenses thus seems
largely consonant with the policies that section implements."). Professor Reese and I simply
read the record differently. Particularly where the governing licensing instruments include ex-
press representations to licensees concerning the permanence of the grant (see supra notes 74,
77, 120, 140, 215, 224-26 and accompanying text) and the open-content community has ap-
parently taken these provisions at face value (see supra notes 75-76, 122, 147 and accompany-
ing text), Professor Reese seems to endorse a simple bait-and-switch, permitting licensors
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ment arose only after the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, however,
and it seems impossible that Congress could have intended, in 1976, to
squelch the commons-based peer production phenomenon that would later
arise.355 The risks that the statute's termination provisions pose to open-con-
tent projects are unintended consequences, not conscious purposes, of the
enacted text.356 Updating the statute to eliminate those unintended conse-
quences would be conceptually valuable insofar as it would recognize, in
positive law, the changes in the baseline assumption of proprietary produc-
tion that have occurred since 1976.
Comprehensive copyright reform-a top-to-bottom statutory rewrite of
the sort Congress is presently debating for the Patent Act 357 -is surely not in
the cards at present for political reasons. Although Professor Pamela Samu-
elson has launched a worthwhile project aimed at sketching the broad con-
tours of a future model copyright law, even she concedes that the effort is
not presently politically feasible.35 s The existing copyright regime supports
concentrated, profitable, and politically influential industries,5 9 and Con-
gress perceives the existing structure of intellectual property law as defining
an area of American competitive advantage in global trade.3 60 Sweeping re-
years after the fact to renege on their own assurances of a perpetual grant and demand compen-
sation from users of the licensed works. To put it another way, Professor Reese and I agree that
current law seems to permit termination of an open-content license even where the terms of the
license provide for a perpetual grant. We differ insofar as I regard this as a flaw, not a benefit,
of the current statutory regime. (I would, of course, have no objection to authors making a
limited-term grant of rights in their works to the use and benefit of the public where the
temporary nature of the grant was apparent on the face of the license, nor to the application of
the termination provisions to a license that was silent as to its intended duration. Nevertheless,
it is not difficult to imagine variations on the latter scenario that would present a more troub-
ling case for termination, as where the licensor by its conduct induces the licensee to believe
that the license is perpetual.)
"' See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (summarizing history of open-content
licenses, the earliest of which was promulgated long after 1976).
356 See supra notes 236-40 and accompanying text (noting that the termination provisions
were intended to counteract licensees' superior bargaining power and to remedy unremunera-
tive transfers).
31 See H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 515, lllth Cong. (2009). A comprehensive
patent reform bill passed the House in 2007, but legislative efforts have remained largely
stalled since that time. See H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
358 See Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 2007 UTAH L.
REV. 551, 556.
"9 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 COR-
NELL L. REv. 857, 861 (1987) (noting that language used in the Copyright Act of 1976 fre-
quently "evolved through a process of negotiation among authors, publishers, and other parties
with economic interests in the property rights the statute defines"); id. at 879 (questioning
whether it makes sense to refer to "legislative intent" in view of the industry-driven negotiated
drafting process); see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 34, ch. 15 (discussing roles of inter-
est groups in influencing copyright legislation); NETANEL, supra note 156, at 184-85 (noting
the relative absence of representatives of the public interest in the copyright legislative
process).
3 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-315, at 9 (1996) (emphasizing risks to U.S. competitiveness
if duration of existing copyrights was not extended); Ruth Gana Okediji, Copyright and Public
Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117, 120 n.9 (1999) (noting that
this perspective is broadly shared among developed nations).
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visions that might affect the economic or competitive interests of market
incumbents, accordingly, are unlikely at present. This places some of the
more far-reaching copyright reform proposals that have been articulated-
such as curtailing copyright holders' power to control derivative works,36
drawing other bright-line boundaries that limit the scope of copyright hold-
ers' rights as against members of the public, 3 62 or resuscitating statutory for-
malities 36 3-off the table almost irrespective of their merits in supporting a
sustainable commons. It is also probably too much to expect Congress to
revisit the statutory termination regime itself, in view of the effects that
amendments to this portion of the statute would have on both authors and
publishers, although it seems quite debatable whether the termination regime
has in fact accomplished its purpose.3 64
More narrowly targeted statutory reform, however, may enjoy better
prospects.3 65 The unintended threats that the statute's termination provisions
pose to open-content licensing schemes may be remedied without affecting
the remainder of the statute. Statutory amendments to protect open-content
projects from the risks of termination might take two forms. Congress might
amend the statute's termination provisions to exclude certain transfers and
licenses from their scope, much as the statute presently excludes works
made for hire and transfers by will.366 In the alternative, Congress might
empower a government agency to promulgate exceptions to the statute's ter-
mination regime, much as the Librarian of Congress presently enjoys the
power to craft exceptions to the statutory anticircumvention provisions of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.3 67
361 See Derek Bambauer, Faulty Math: The Economics of Legalizing the Grey Album, 59
ALA. L. REv. 345 (2008).
362 See David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139 (2009). In
view of the influence that copyright holders presently exercise in the legislative process, see
supra note 359, it seems unlikely that any bright-line copyright "metes and bounds" would be
drafted in a way that expands, rather than curtails, the scope of uses for which members of the
public do not require the copyright holder's permission.
363 See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004).
31 See Samuelson, supra note 358, at 566-67 n.101; see also supra note 266 and accom-
panying text.
365 In the present political climate, the likelihood of enacting any proposed copyright
amendment likely varies inversely to its perceived effects on the existing balance of power as
between publishers and users of expressive works. See Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation
and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REv. 27, 357 (1989) ("Every proposal to change the
status quo has received opposition from some camp on the ground that it would remove a
perceived advantage enjoyed under current law." (footnote omitted)). But see Samuelson,
supra note 358, at 556 ("Even modest reform efforts . . . have encountered difficulties in
reaching consensus."). This Article's focus on incremental reforms tailored to the specific
problem at hand carries no implication that more far-reaching copyright revisions are in any
way normatively undesirable, only that they are unnecessary to solve the termination problem
for open-content licenses.
" See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
367 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(B)-(D) (2006); Armstrong, supra note 130, at 8 n.28 (not-
ing limited reach of DMCA exemptions approved by Librarian to date).
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Complicating either approach will be the need to protect open-content
licenses against termination, while not preventing authors who made un-
remunerative bargains from exercising their termination rights. The forego-
ing discussion suggests two conceptual constructs upon which Congress
might draw to ensure that any open-content termination exception does not
swallow the general rule. First, Professor Loren's proposal for a modified
doctrine of copyright abandonment, while perhaps ill-matched to existing
precedent, nevertheless draws a useful line: she proposes to exclude licenses
that overtly and clearly grant rights to the public from the operation of the
statute's termination provisions. 68 Second, the very brief statutory provision
on patent abandonment also limits the reach of intellectual property rights in
circumstances where the author clearly intended to give up the right of pro-
prietary exploitation.3 69
To consider one possibility, Congress might add the following provi-
sion as a new paragraph 203(a)(6) of the statute:
No abandonment by an author of any of the exclusive rights com-
prised in a copyright, in whole or in part, including under the
terms of nonexclusive licensing instruments that grant such rights
to unnamed licensees, shall be subject to termination under this
section.
Limiting the exception to abandonments "by an author" would amelio-
rate the risk, identified by Professor Kreiss, that certain actions by down-
stream licensees may permanently restrict authors' rights.370 The words
"including" and "in whole or in part" are aimed at assuring the permanency
of dedications to the public domain and at allowing partial abandonments.3 7'
The reference to "unnamed licensees" is one way of distinguishing what
Professor Loren refers to as grants "to the public" from more conventional
transfers (such as in the Superman case) from one party to another; other
language might certainly be chosen to effectuate a similar distinction. The
reference to "abandonment" may be thought to introduce ambiguity, but the
legislative history should simply clarify that the concept is drawn from the
Patent Act.3 72 Adding a new termination exception for open-content licenses
" See supra note 318 and accompanying text; see generally supra Part IV.A.
369 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(c) (2006). See generally supra notes 331-34 and accompanying
text.
370 See supra notes 242, 308-10 and accompanying text.
-"' The Copyright Act's definition of "including" should suffice to ensure that the pro-
posed exception, although meant to reach open-content licensing arrangements, is not confined
to that context. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("The terms 'including' and 'such as' are illustrative and
not limitative."). See generally supra Part III.B.3.
372 It should not be necessary to add a definition of "abandonment" to the Copyright Act;
after all, the Patent Act's abandonment provision does not define the term, either. Cf 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. The courts are accustomed to filling in statutory gaps of this sort in copyright cases. See
I PATRY, supra note 157, § 2:1 ("[C]ritical components of copyright law are judge-made ....
[T]he Act is a mixture of statutory and common-law features.").
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may, of course, require Congress to make conforming amendments else-
where in the statutory text.373
Would this amendment upset the existing balance of power as between
authors and publishers? It is difficult to see how the amendment would give
an unscrupulous licensee any new power to "game the system" to its own
advantage.3 74 The worst apparent risk is that a licensee might pressure an
author to release her work under an open-content license (or to the public
domain) at the expiration of a defined initial period of exclusive license to
the licensee. 75 If the licensee enjoys a period of exclusive use of the work,
and the work then becomes available to the public, the original licensee may
continue exploiting the work without fear of termination under the amend-
ment proposed above. But the public at large would enjoy precisely the same
privilege following the expiration of the exclusive license. Thus, not only
does the licensee not gain a greater advantage under this arrangement, it
actually yields a benefit to the commons-precisely the reason why it makes
sense to protect such licenses from termination.
As an alternative to crafting its own termination exception for open-
content licenses, Congress might delegate that task to a federal agency.37 6 For
example, consider the following proposed new § 203(a)(6):
The Librarian of Congress, upon recommendation of the Register
of Copyrights, shall promulgate annually a listing of licensing in-
struments that it finds to grant copyright rights to the public at
large, and such licensing instruments shall not be subject to termi-
nation under this section.
373 For example, the phrase "otherwise than by will" in 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) might be
amended to read "otherwise than by will or as provided below."
... See Menell & Nimmer, supra note 255 (suggesting this test as a touchstone to govern
judicial interpretations of the existing termination provisions).
17' For example, a license of the general form "exclusively to Licensee for a period of
thirty-four years, thence to the public domain." The period of exclusive license would have to
be shorter than the thirty-five-year duration that marks the opening of the statutory termination
window, otherwise the licensee gains no ability to alter the existing termination regime by this
route. (This arrangement, of course, presents a variation on Professor Kreiss's hypothetical in
which a downstream licensee aims to dedicate the licensed work to the public domain as a
means of avoiding termination. See Kreiss, supra note 256.)
376 For a regulatory system of such complexity and economic scope, copyright is unusual
in that it has remained largely unaffected by the post-New Deal expansion in the power of
administrative agencies. See Litman, supra note 365, at 356-57 (noting lack of support at the
time of the Copyright Act of 1976 for proposal to extend substantive copyright rulemaking
responsibilities to an administrative agency). Indeed, a large part of the complexity of the
Copyright Act of 1976 stems from its inclusion of exceedingly detailed and complicated tech-
nical provisions that might be better handled by administrative regulation. See Samuelson,
supra note 358, at 558 (recommending "an administrative process" to address "future ad-
vanced technology questions" as a means of "getting rid of some of the clutter in the existing
statute"). Proposals to increase the role of administrative agencies recur often in contemporary
copyright scholarship. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, A Quick and Inexpen-
sive System for Resolving Peer-to-Peer Copyright Disputes, 23 CARDozo ARTS & Err. L.J. 1
(2005); Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 395 (2009).
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This provision would involve the federal copyright agencies in formu-
lating a list of licenses that are not subject to termination. The agencies
would be required to undertake notice-and-comment rulemaking, but not to
hold hearings,377 essentially the same procedure as currently applies to the
triennial DMCA exemptions.378 The reference to a required finding that a
license "grant[s] copyright rights to the public at large" is again meant to
aid in identifying the particular licenses that are to be excluded from the.
operation of the statute's termination provisions (which would continue to
apply to traditional arm's-length transactions between named parties) and to
provide enforceable standards to guide the agency's rulemaking discretion.
The agency might initially draw upon lists of open-content licenses that are
maintained by private bodies, although it surely should not limit itself to
those lists in view of the somewhat different purposes the termination ex-
emptions are meant to serve.379
Clarity and flexibility would be the most obvious advantages of an ad-
ministrative regime to promulgate exceptions to the statute's termination
provisions for open-content licensing. Consulting the agency's list of non-
terminable licenses would provide advance assurances to licensees that con-
tributions to an open-content project would remain in the commons in
perpetuity. Furthermore, as licensing instruments continued to evolve, the
list of non-terminable licenses could expand as well.
Would an administrative exemption process for open-content licensing
upset the existing statutory balance? Every delegation of rulemaking author-
ity presents some risk of regulatory capture, and it is possible, albeit un-
likely, that the Librarian's power might be subject to abuse. For example,
suppose the Librarian interceded on behalf of a powerful movie studio to
declare non-terminable a license, like Siegel and Shuster's, upon which the
studio had built a lucrative franchise.380 The amended statute's reference to
licenses that "grant copyright rights to the public at large" ought to ensure
that such a misapplication of the agency's power does not survive judicial
review. Remaining issues-such as the inevitable lag between the promulga-
tion of a new open-content license and its recognition as such by the Libra-
rian or the effects of the Librarian's removal of a previously recognized
license from the non-terminable list-could probably be handled within the
confines of the administrative process without judicial intervention.
... See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
378 See supra note 367 and accompanying text.
... FSF and OSI, for example, maintain lists of licensing instruments that are believed to
be compatible with those organizations' governing philosophies, see supra note 48, but there is
no persuasive reason to limit the termination exemption to licenses that happen to appear on
either organization's list. The original version of the Artistic License, for example, would make
a prime candidate to be protected against termination, even though neither FSF nor OSI ap-
proved it. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
" See supra Part II.B. I (discussing the Superman case).
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VI. CONCLUSION
For the open-content movement, termination is a problem worth solv-
ing. Open-content advocates have skillfully leveraged copyright concepts to
create a vibrant and growing commons of freely reusable creative works of
many types-a grand achievement given the proprietary production para-
digm implicit in the language and structure of the Copyright Act. The new
open-content commons rests upon a set of remarkable licensing instruments
that use the architecture of control as a means to create freedom. That free-
dom, however, finds itself imperiled by other provisions of the statute, pro-
visions that have been insufficiently scrutinized to date for their possible
effects on the open-content commons. If applied according to their literal
terms, these statutory clauses cloud the question whether the open-content
commons is sustainable. The issue has not yet been adequately presented due
to the lapse of insufficient time. Fewer than thirty-five years (the statutory
minimum) have elapsed since the widespread adoption of open-content li-
censing arrangements. Absent preventive action, however, termination
problems may substantially complicate open-content projects in the future.
The natural inclination for open-content advocates would surely be to
seek to solve the problem through skillful redrafting of the governing licens-
ing instruments. The CCO license, while not without flaws, reflects the best
recent thinking in this regard; it recognizes its own potential infirmity under
existing law and supplies an alternative means to effectuate the licensor's
intent.38 The same statutory provisions that create the termination problem
in the first place, however, simultaneously limit the curative power of pri-
vate drafting arrangements. Because the statute expressly overrides licensing
agreements that purport to limit or deny authors' termination rights, the sim-
plest and most direct private responses to the risk of termination are effec-
tively off the table. Furthermore, although some courts have suggested that
licensors can postpone the termination issue by relicensing their own prior
grants of rights,382 requiring open-content licensors to (for example) continu-
ally execute new instruments that supersede their own prior grants of rights
to the public would provide, at best, a cumbersome way of avoiding the
termination problem.
Judicial action, too, may be inadequate to the task. On the one hand,
courts do carry substantial policymaking responsibilities in copyright mat-
ters, certainly more so than in other areas that are nominally governed by
statute.383 On the other hand, ours is a textualist age, and judges have warned
(in other contexts) against looking outside the enacted text to ascertain Con-
gress's intent.3 A court presented with an actual attempt to terminate an
381 See supra notes 221-29 and accompanying text.
382 See supra note 255.
383 See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 130, at 32-36.
"' See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATrER OF
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open-content license may perceive the absurdity of the request, may be cog-
nizant of the absence of any possible overreaching by the licensees, and may
even regret the harm to the information commons that would surely follow
were the request to be granted; yet, the court may nevertheless believe itself
obliged to honor the statute's command that any "exclusive or nonexclusive
grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a copy-
right" '385 is terminable by the author or her heirs. That leaves remedial legis-
lation as the best, and likely only viable, alternative to cure the termination
problem for open-content licenses.
Legislative recognition of the effectiveness and permanence of open-
content licensing arrangements would place a safety net under the emerging
information commons. It would validate commons-based peer production as
an alternative mode of creating value entitled to stand on equal footing with
the institutional monopolies of copyright. It would confirm, as a matter of
statutory law, what has been clear in the marketplace for many years-that
open-content works include mature products perfectly capable of competing
alongside copyrighted proprietary works on their merits. It would align the
law with the reasonable expectations of authors (numbering in the millions
in the United States alone) who write open-source software, contribute
photos to Flickr, add content to Wikipedia or its sister sites, build architec-
tural edifices in Second Life, or write weblogs, all while expecting and in-
tending that their contributions will forever remain available for others to
enjoy. Finally, it would signal the United States' intent to remain in the inno-
vation vanguard, while doing nothing to reduce the effectiveness of the ordi-
nary copyright regime for authors and publishers who choose that
alternative. For all these reasons, the better course would be for Congress to
provide a statutory exception to the Copyright Act's termination provisions
for open-content works.
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 20 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) ("Congress
can enact foolish statutes as well as wise ones, and it is not for the courts to decide which is
which and rewrite the former.").
385 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2006).
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